Fannie Mae

President Barack Obama today announced a plan to cut foreclosures and reboot new mortgage financings, at least when the economy shows signs of new life. The fact of offering a plan is an advance, given that Bush and his people did nothing and proposed nothing, even as the crisis reached critical mass. As we have written here since the crisis first broke, keeping people in their homes is fundamental to solving the larger economic problem. Again, it’s the fast-rising foreclosures and mortgage delinquencies that are eroding and destroying the value of hundreds of billions of dollars in mortgage-backed securities and the credit default swaps that “back them up” (sic). And it’s the falling value of those securities and swaps, in turn, which has led to the effective bankruptcy of financial institutions that had leveraged themselves to their eyeballs to buy them or issued them and then kept them (and how dumb was that?).

While the act of proposing anything serious puts the Obama Administration ahead of its predecessor, passing such a low threshold is hardly very meaningful -- especially since the problems continue to worsen. More than nine percent of mortgages today are either in foreclosure or delinquent, two to three times the numbers from just two years earlier; and if everything continues to unravel, those numbers could double in another year. If that happens, there won’t be many large, U.S. banks left standing. Many of the homeowners now in trouble could manage, if they just could refinance at current rates. But banks quite naturally see someone in financial trouble as a poor credit risk for a new loan, which is what refinancing is. And the fall in housing prices means tens of millions of those people can’t qualify to refinance. That’s because refinancing is available today only if you owe no more than 80 percent of the original mortgage’s value. The catch for millions of families is that as the value of their home goes down, their existing mortgage (the one being refinanced) accounts for a greater percentage of the value being refinanced. In the worst cases, people just walk away from a $200,000 home with a $300,000 mortgage -- and who would refinance one of those? In millions of other, less extreme cases, the falling prices simply disqualify people for refinancing.

The Administration wants to address this precise part of the problem, by providing $75 billion in subsidies to banks to defray half of the cost of refinancing for several million homeowners at risk of losing their homes. Mortgages owned by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are also eligible here, and they’re the ones most likely to actually see their interest rates reset, since the government owns Fannie and Freddie and can direct them to do it. It will be harder to convince bankers already staring at enormous losses already on their books or soon to be there, especially if they’re worried that their bondholders could sue them for resetting loans. The plan also has some $100 billion for the Treasury to keep buying more of Fannie and Freddie’s failing mortgage-backed securities since, as we also have said repeatedly, until foreclosure rates return to normal, the biggest bank bailout in the world won’t prevent more banking losses.

There are more direct ways to address foreclosures. We could provide direct loans to tide over those in trouble, or Fannie and Freddie could reset the loans of everyone in trouble. The problem is that anyone advancing such a common sense approach would become a very large political target -- and not just for reflexively-critical House Republicans.

How could the president or his advisors explain to those who work hard and spend less, so they can keep their mortgage payments up to date, why they don’t qualify for a lower interest rate from the government, when their neighbor who spent more or just had harder luck does qualify? More plainly, how does the government choose who would qualify for such direct help without enraging most of those who wouldn’t? In effect, the Administration plan finesses this problem by letting banks choose, without compelling them to do so. But what if the economy continues to worsen and the plan doesn’t work, which is a very real possibility? Indeed, don’t be surprised to see the Administration revisit it six months from now with a much less “voluntary” approach.

Barack Obama's historic election as a new, national agent of change will face a daunting test as the economic crisis continues to accelerate, and the political pressures arising from what must now be called “The Great Recession” begin to reshape the response.

The latest evidence is today’s unemployment data: one million jobs lost in two months; the sharpest eight-month rise in the jobless rate since 1945, when tens of millions of soldiers and sailors were demobilized; and losses across every sector and every region. Jobs are in freefall along with the markets, investment, consumer spending and household wealth. And economists are now genuinely frightened by the course the Great Recession is taking, because there’s been nothing like it in anyone’s experience.

That’s why long-time advocates of fiscal probity now call for stimulus topping $1 trillion, and why every spending and tax idea floating around Congress for the last decade is back on the table again. The political pressures and real concerns are so overwhelming that there’s talk of large tax cuts, despite the consensus among economists that when people and businesses are as economically downcast as they are today, tax relief has little stimulus power. That’s not only politics at work; it also reflects a sense of grave foreboding among many of those same economists.

We do need unprecedented stimulus – but all of the stimulus in the world won’t change the course of this crisis until we also address its underlying forces. The wealth of American households and the portfolios of American financial institutions will continue to tank until the housing market stabilizes -- or at least until foreclosure rates return to normal. And the most aggressive, easy policy in our history won’t be enough, and financial institutions won’t begin normal lending again, until they’re more confident that the hundreds of billions of dollars in mortgage-backed securities and other derivatives they still own aren’t headed for the drain as well.

The new Administration can take on these challenges directly, as candidate Obama pledged to do with extraordinary foresight. For example, we can impose a 90-day moratorium on foreclosures and use the time to renegotiate the terms of tens of thousands of distressed mortgages held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. One idea promoted by many economists is to convert those mortgages to 30-year fixed at 5.25 percent, which happens to be long-term mean rate for Fannie and Freddie mortgages. It won’t stop foreclosures, but it should bring down foreclosure rates to near-normal levels, which would do more to stabilize the financial system than the bailouts in the Bush Administration’s own Wall Street version of tsunami stimulus. And some tough love from the new Treasury Secretary could help restart the lending process: having done what we can to stabilize the value of their portfolios, we should consider requiring institutions receiving federal aid to use a real share of that assistance to restart their lending.

We need large-scale stimulus, but it will only work if we first address the underlying problems. Otherwise, 18 months from now, we could be $1 trillion poorer and have little to show for it.

On virtually everything economic, the Bush Administration and much of Congress have become the gang that can't shoot straight -- and their stray bullets could take down a good piece of the nation's economic prospects. They have directed hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars to financial institutions (and soon, auto companies), and they're getting ready to direct several hundred billion more at the overall economy. In all of these instances, a political drive to display the will and capacity for large actions has overwhelmed deliberate thinking about the specific consequences of those actions. The Obama presidency and the country may pay a big price for this scattershot approach.

The latest example of this dangerous development is the ever-expanding size of the long-awaited next stimulus. We're in a deep and serious recession and a major stimulus was certainly needed -- mainly six months ago, when the Bush Administration and Congress provided tax rebates which were largely saved and had little stimulative effect. Now we know how bad the downturn is turning out to be, and Congress and the Administration-in-waiting is preparing another stimulus of a size commensurate with what's already unfolding, once again, as if this were six or eight months ago. A stimulus providing another $200 billion to $300 billion in new federal spending makes sense, mainly as insurance for another shock to the economy. But a $500 billion to $750 billion package like the one now under discussion will miss its target by many months and mainly indicates that the new rule is that anything goes when you win and damn the consequences.

Congress seems intent on responding to this recession as if everything known about how the business cycle works can be ignored, and the consequences could be serious. The Obama team is focused on long-term investments in 21^st century energy and transportation infrastructure, modernizing health care records, expanding training and education, and extending broadband and IT access for poor children. That's all good news for the long-term health of the economy and for the incomes of many households.  The catch is, long-term investments entail not a one-time boost in spending, but continued funding. So when we raise the ante on those investments from $100 billion or so to $300 billion, $400 billion or $500 billion, we're implicitly choosing either to foreswear any other commitments, such as health care, or to embrace another round of dangerously large, structural deficits.

Since the new politics seems to involve never saying no, the likely result of the current course, on top of the extraordinary infusions of credit by the Federal Reserve, is serious inflation once the downturn begins to resolve itself. This pattern is disturbingly similar to the short-sighted and cavalier approach to long-term risks that got the nation into this mess. And it continues to develop alongside the Treasury and Congress' continuing inability to address the rising foreclosures still driving the financial crisis and the credit freeze accelerating the downturn. Yet real responses are within reach: place a moratorium on foreclosures while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac renegotiate the terms of millions of troubled mortgages and link financial bailout funds to a commitment to use them to extend credit to businesses. If we do that, the economy won't need so much fiscal or monetary stimulus. 

The current approach presents other serious risks. This pattern of fast-rising spending, on top of the bailouts already done and those to come, as well as more tax cuts, could push the U.S. deficit to levels that even the United States will have trouble financing. The Asian and Middle Eastern governments that provide much of our public financing could stop -- either because they'll see inflation coming, too, or because the global downturn and falling oil prices sharply reduce their savings and thus, their ability to lend them to us. The U.S. Treasury will always find the funds it needs, but it may have to pay a lot more to borrow them, which means higher interest rates. So the current approach risks an interest rate spike on top of everything else, which at best would lead to a substandard recovery. With all of its talent and broad public support, the Obama presidency should be able to do a lot better than that.

As President-elect Barack Obama turns to the enormous challenges facing the nation, his first priority will be to set his priorities. Already, there are more urgent problems than any president could tackle successfully in a single term, and even more will almost certainly emerge. Moreover, he now will have to lead in ways he did not have to as candidate, by taking real and contentious actions. His historic, landslide election will give him greater, initial political capital than any president since Ronald Reagan. Even so, capital gets spent, and a president’s power and influence are finite, so he will have to choose precisely where he intends to focus all that capital, power and influence.

The lead items on his domestic agenda must be the nation’s financial and economic crisis. That will require, first, steps to slow housing foreclosures. He has pledged to initiate a 90-day moratorium on foreclosures, but that would be only a first, modest step. He also could also create a new fund to lend tide-over funds to homeowners facing foreclosure after the 90 days are up, and while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac work out a responsible plan for them to renegotiate the terms and interest rates on the mortgages of homeowners in distress. He also can help banks get credit flowing again with a temporary, reduced tax rate on an estimated $700 billion in profits now held abroad by the foreign subsidiaries of American companies.

That step also could provide a measure of stimulus for an economy currently entering what is likely to be a long, nasty recession, and addressing the recession also must be one of President Obama’s first priorities. Tax rebates won’t work, since most Americans would most likely save any new checks rather than spend them. So Washington will have to jumpstart the nation’s additional spending, with a new spending package of $200 billion to $250 billion. And President Obama should focus most of it on the long-term investments he called for during the campaign, including grants to digitize health care records and provide access to computer training for current workers, and new supports to modernize the electricity grid and accelerate the development and spread of alternative energy. On top of that – and grants to cash-strapped states so they can avoid large cuts in their Medicaid programs and their workforces – the new president should focus the infrastructure piece of his stimulus on creating a national infrastructure financing bank and initiating new commitments for low-polluting light rail systems in major metropolitan areas.

The president will also hear demands and pleas for a new regulatory framework for the financial sector. That task is clearly a necessary and urgent one, but getting it right will be a long, complex process. His best move would be to create a national, expert commission with a mandate to figure it out over the next six months and report back to the nation.

The president’s serious priority-setting can only really begin once he addresses those emergencies – and it won’t be easy. The stimulus measures can be the first steps toward meeting his pledge to help build a more energy-efficient and climate-friendly economy. And since he will have to choose, the rest of that agenda should probably take lower priority than health care reform. One reason is that while the recession will cut energy prices and energy use with no help from Washington, for at least a time, it will only worsen out health care problems. The recession will further increase the numbers of people without coverage, perhaps by millions, without making a dent in the steady, sharp increases in health care costs that will continue to cut into jobs and wages. And any further delay will only make it all worse. It’s time to carry out his plans to make coverage much more nearly universal, and tie those extensions to a hard-nosed program of cost controls that will require hospitals and clinics to adopt the best practices of the country’s most cost efficient medical centers.

This will leave President Obama with plenty to tackle in the second half of his term. That can be the time to take further steps to help make America more climate friendly and energy efficient. It also has to be the time to build on the cost-control lessons from health care reform and finally address the serious and treacherous business of reforming Medicare and other entitlement spending for tens of millions of Baby Boomers.

And if President Obama can make real progress in these priority areas over his first term, it will almost certainly earn him an even bigger national landslide for a second term. 

The price of what are called “credit default swaps” for U.S. Treasury debt is rising sharply. Credit default swaps are financial instruments by which one investor holding debt pays another investor to guarantee that if that debt defaults, he will make the first investor whole. 

This week, the Treasury assumed responsibility for $5.2 trillion in outstanding debts held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. A modest but significant share of that is headed for default, and the Treasury will have to absorb the losses. And the result is a rising price for credit default swaps on the U.S. Government: It now costs $18,000 to insure $10 million of U.S. Treasury debt. The market sees a very small - but not negligible - prospect that the U.S. Government would actually default on its debt, which would be, well, the end of the American and global economies as we know them. That’s how bad it is.

Credit default swaps for subprime mortgage based securities, of course, have played a significant role in the current unraveling in the financial markets. But conservative/Republican disdain for normal regulation of those markets has played the larger, underlying role.  Such regulation isn’t intended to “manage” those markets, but to ensure that the rest of us are protected from serious repercussions when problematic choices by financial market players (for example, to double down on subprime mortgages or their derivatives) collide with adverse conditions that make those problematic choices very reckless.

That’s the essential meaning of the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac regulatory bailouts. Setting aside the many years of astonishingly reckless and self-interested management at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage market would freeze up if these two institutions suddenly couldn’t operate. Here’s a brief course in why that’s so: there’s always plenty of credit for new mortgages, because those creating the mortgages promptly sell them, in bundles, to investors, so that the credit can cycle back to finance more mortgages. 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both create and buy trillions of dollars in these mortgage-backed securities, and there’s no financial institution that could step in if they were taken out of the picture. That’s why we need to keep them operating, even if it requires a bailout. By the way, the other major holders of these securities include U.S. banks – expect a line of them to go belly-up in the next six months – and foreign central banks. 

The potential unpleasant fallout for our relations with other countries if their holdings went bust is the other reason that the Bush Administration has taken the largest interventionist step in U.S. financial markets since the Great Depression. Once again, the Bush Administration is moved to act not by what’s happening to Americans, but by the implications for our relations with other countries