Millennial Generation

Unpublished
n/a

Winograd and Hais: Do you get the Millennial Generation?

5/15/09
The Christian Science Monitor

By Morley Winograd and Mike Hais

MTV premièred in August 1981, seven months after Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as America's 40th president. It revolutionized TV and the music industry as much as Reagan changed the country's politics.

And now, just as the election of Barack Obama to the presidency signaled the end of that political era and the beginning of another, MTV is belatedly shifting gears as well.

The network, long known for cynical and vapid content, has suddenly understood the importance of being earnest. Booze and bikinis are out. Do-good singers and hard-working art students are in.

MTV acknowledged that its programming had become out of step with the progressive, service-oriented values of today's youth, the Millennial Generation. "It was very clear we were at one of those transformational moments, when this new generation of Millennials [born between 1982 and 2003] were demanding a new MTV," a channel executive explained.

After losing ground for years, MTV finally got it. But many other corporations and institutions – the Republican Party comes to mind – still don't. As a result, they risk alienating the approximately 95 million young Americans who will be defining the nation's politics and culture for decades to come.

MTV's mistake was to assume that the members of particular demographic groups, in this instance young people in their mid-teens through their mid-20s, behave the same and hold the same attitudes at all times. If only MTV's executives had gone to the movies more often, they might have recognized these generational changes much sooner.

For baby boomers (born 1946-1964), a generation of idealists driven by strong personal values, no coming-of-age-movie captured their rebellious and moralistic spirit better than "The Graduate." The protagonist, Benjamin Braddock, is a depressed loner who rejects his parents' "plastic" values. In his dalliance with Mrs. Robinson, Benjamin seeks emotional attachment and deeper meaning, whereas she is in the "relationship" only for physical release.

The movie ends as Benjamin rescues his true love, Elaine (Mrs. Robinson's daughter) from an "arranged" marriage by blocking the door from the church with a cross. Benjamin and Elaine ride away on a bus, embracing a new idealistic lifestyle while forever turning their backs on the shallow and meaningless existence of their parents.

But the tone of coming-of-age movies shifted dramatically when Generation X (born 1965-1981) became teenagers and 20-somethings in the 1980s. This generation was best represented in "Risky Business."

Tom Cruise portrays Joel Goodsen, an alienated young man who, like many real-life Gen-Xers, is a latchkey kid abandoned by his vacationing parents at their suburban home.

Unlike Benjamin Braddock, Joel does not use his alienation from the grown-up world as a reason to pursue deeper values. Instead, he uses his time alone to perform an iconic dance in his underwear while lip-synching to "Old Time Rock and Roll." He wrecks the family car, hires a hooker, and, in true Gen-X entrepreneurial fashion, provides a "for hire" outlet to satisfy his friends' sexual desires, using the family home as his place of business.

Contrast those stories with the emblematic Millennial movie "The Devil Wears Prada."

Millennials are the American generation least bound by gender role expectations, so it isn't surprising that the protagonist is a young woman with an androgynous name, Andy (Sachs). Because Millennials are also the most tolerant American generation, it's not surprising that Andy's best friends are an African-American woman, a gay man, and her sensitive boyfriend who aspires to be a chef. In true Millennial fashion, Andy constantly relies on her friends and parents, whom she adores, for love, advice, and support.

Andy is temporarily attracted by the glitter of the world of high fashion. However, like others of this generation who are driven by a desire to solve society's problems, she realizes her true calling is far different.

She breaks with her boss, Miranda Priestly, at the fashion magazine where she works, so that she can take a job writing for a liberal newspaper. But, as a polite and conventional Millennial, the break is not harsh. In fact, her old boss, the devil herself, provides the crucial reference for Andy's new job.

Everyone in politics and pop culture should learn the lesson MTV belatedly has. To really understand the preferences of young people, take a look at their generation and not simply their age. That will tell you everything you need to know.

Morley Winograd and Michael D. Hais are fellows at NDN, a progressive think tank in Washington, and the New Policy Institute. They are coauthors of “Millennial Makeover: MySpace, YouTube, and the Future of American Politics.”

His Crowd

5/14/09
The Atlantic

By Ronald Brownstein

All the controversy about President Obama's upcoming appearance at Notre Dame is overshadowing a larger point about the university commencement tour he began Wednesday night in Arizona: Obama is presenting Democrats an opportunity to establish a lasting and potentially crushing advantage with the Millennial Generation, the largest in American history.

Young voters are not as reflexively Democratic or liberal as many people might think. Since 18-year-olds were granted the vote in 1972, younger voters have often tracked fairly close to the national trend in presidential elections: Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush carried them in 1984 and 1988, and they split almost evenly between Al Gore and George W. Bush in 2000.

But over the past three elections, voters under 30 have moved steadily toward the Democrats. In the 2004 presidential race, John Kerry carried 54% of them, compared to only 48% of the country overall. In 2006, Democrats won 60% of voters under 30 in the mid-term House elections, according to the national exit poll. Then in 2008, the bottom fell out for Republicans: against John McCain, Obama won a stunning 66% of voters 18-29. Partially Obama ran so well among young people because so many of them are non-white, and he dominated among non-whites at every age. But the exit polls found Obama also won 54% of white voters under 29; even the younger Bush carried 55% of whites under 30 in each of his two elections.

If anything, Obama's position with the Millennial generation appears even stronger today. Apart from African-Americans, these young people have been Obama's most enthusiastic and consistent supporters in office. In the Gallup tracking polling that's been conducted since January, Obama's approval rating among voters younger than 30 has never fallen below 66%. His approval rating among young voters consistently runs somewhere between six and nine points higher than his overall showing: today, Obama receives positive approval ratings from a dizzying 75% of voters under 30, compared to 66% from the country overall.

Another set of numbers Gallup released earlier this month shows how Obama's strength can bolster his party. Gallup cumulated all of its 123,000 interviews this year to examine party identification in the electorate. Among the Millennial generation, it found that just 21% identify as Republicans, compared to 36% as Democrats and 34% as independents. "Republicans, for all practical purposes, aren't even on the radar screen with them," says Michael D. Hais, a fellow at the Democratic advocacy group NDN, and co-author of Millennial Makeover, a recent book on the generation.

The enormous advantage among young people for Obama in particular and Democrats in general matters for two reasons. The more immediate is that this generation, which is generally defined as the 93 million people born between 1983 and 2002, will comprise a rapidly increasing share of voters through the next decade. Hais and his co-author, Morley Winograd, also an NDN fellow, have calculated that in 2008, 41% of Millennials were eligible to vote, and they constituted 17% of the electorate. They project that by 2012, 61% of the Millennials will be eligible, and they'll comprise 24% of the electorate; by 2016, the numbers will reach 80% and 30%. By 2020, virtually all of them will be eligible and they could constitute as much as 36% of all voters. If Obama maintains anything near his current strength among Millennials, they will produce a substantially larger vote surplus for him in 2012 than they did in 2008-leaving Republicans a larger deficit to overcome with older voters.

Obama's strength among young people has a second, even more significant, implication: if Republicans cannot reverse it reasonably soon, it could harden into a lasting preference for Democrats in this huge generation. Political scientists and political strategists generally divide into two camps over how partisan allegiances are formed. The lifecycle camp argues that people's views change at different points in their life, with many voters, for instance, becoming more averse to taxes as they acquire families and mortgages. Surely some of that occurs; few people's political preferences are entirely static or so deeply held they cannot be disrupted, at least temporarily, by events.

But probably the dominant camp believes partisan allegiances are forged mostly by the social, economic and political experiences that shape a generation's upbringing. As Winograd and Hais wrote, "Members of the electorate are most easily persuaded when they are young, before their beliefs harden into attitudes they will retain throughout their lives." Kristen Soltis, director of policy research at the Winston Group, a Republican polling firm, has studied young people and politics, and she largely agrees. "I fall into the camp that see it as more generational-that there are period effects that come into play when someone becomes [politically] active, and that colors the way you look at politics throughout your life," she said.

Other numbers from the Gallup polls conducted this year point toward that interpretation. Gallup provided me with their figures breaking out party identification by age on a year-by-year basis. It found unmistakable patterns of allegiance to the two parties that track the most consequential presidencies of recent times.

Democrats did best among voters who turned 18 since George W. Bush took office in 2001 (those now aged 18 through 25). Among those voters, the Democratic Party identification advantage ranged from 14 to 18 percentage points. Democrats also did well, but not quite as well, among those who turned 18 while Bill Clinton was President (those who are now 26 to 33). Among this group, the Democratic Party identification advantage stood at 9 to 12 percentage points. The story was very different in the generation that turned 18 during Ronald Reagan's eight years as president. Those voters (who are now 38 to 45) preferred Democrats over Republicans by only three to nine percentage points. "Those are the Reagan babies," said Winograd.

These striking patterns in attitude underscore the stakes for the two sides through the remainder of Obama's presidency. Soltis says the durability of generational preferences should inspire more urgency among Republicans about the possibility of Obama locking down this cohort for Democrats. She wants the party to emphasize themes of opportunity and to criticize Obama for saddling young people with exploding federal debts. Mostly she wants the party to focus on all the dimensions of its challenge with young people. "We've still got a chance, but it's something that needs to be acted upon quickly," she says.

Winograd and Hais believe Republicans can't do much to detach young voters from Obama if the president is seen as succeeding. In Millennial Makeover, they argue that many of this generation's formative experiences-their diversity, their tolerance of difference, and the patterns of parenting that inclined them to find collective "win-win" solutions-already inclined them toward Democratic beliefs. The perception that Bush failed in the White House reinforced the Millennials' tilt toward Democrats; now Obama, they maintain, has the chance to cement those ties. "They already know that Republicans messed up a la Bush; the question is will Obama turn out to be the successful president they all expect him to be?" Winograd said. The analogy, Winograd and Hais maintain, could be the way Franklin Roosevelt's success built upon Herbert Hoover's failure and created a generation of FDR Democrats that bolstered his party for decades. In the same way, they argue, if Obama succeeds, he "could be the final piece" bonding this generation to Democrats. Of course, if he fails, those bonds could be severely strained, especially since young people have invested so much hope in him.

Either way, it is the lasting loyalty of this mammoth young generation, far more than the dust-up over abortion, that is the real prize at play as Obama begins his first campus tour as president.

Is Meghan McCain the New Face of the GOP?

5/12/09
San Francisco Chronicle

NDN fellow Morley Winograd says the younger McCain's growing following underscores an "underlying conflict" in the party - between opposing forces and generations.

San Francisco Chronicle Front Page

Morley and Mike Featured on Front Page of SF Chronicle Today

In addition to their Op-ed in Sunday's LA Times, NDN's Morley Winograd and Mike Hais were featured in an excellent front-page story by Carla Marinucci in today's San Francisco Chronicle. The article, entitled "Is Meghan McCain the New Face of the GOP?", looks at how Republicans can appeal to Millennial voters. From the article:

The 24-year-old daughter of U.S. Sen. John McCain, the 2008 GOP presidential candidate, is a regular political blogger and most certainly not her mother Cindy's serene, St. John-suit-wearing stereotype of a Republican woman.

In brash blog posts on the Daily Beast - "The GOP doesn't understand sex" - and outpouring of posts on Twitter, she has described herself as a pro-sex, "pro-life, pro-gay-marriage Republican," one who experts say may be at the forefront of a new GOP breed: the "Meghan McCain Republican."

That GOP faction is younger and interested in fiscal responsibility and less government involvement in people's lives, while supporting environmentalism and civic engagement. They're part of the millennial generation, the largest and most diverse generation in American history, whose voters - born starting in the early 1980s - cast ballots for Barack Obama by a more than 2-to-1 ratio.

"That's the kind of positioning it will take to appeal to more millennials," says author Mike Hais, a fellow with NDN, the Washington think tank formerly known as the New Democrat Network. And the party will be in a stronger position "to the extent that Meghan and others will find a way to appeal to Republicans by de-emphasizing the extremes on social issues."

NDN fellow Morley Winograd, who along with Hais co-authored "Millennial Makeover: MySpace, YouTube and the Future of American Politics," says the younger McCain's growing following underscores an "underlying conflict" in the party - between opposing forces and generations. The co-authors will speak tonight at an NDN seminar in San Francisco that will examine the effects of the millennial vote. Winograd says that vote will determine the GOP's future "for the next 20 years," when the generation will comprise 1 out of every 3 American voters.

Winograd and Hais: The Republican Party Ignores Young 'Millennials' at Its Peril

5/10/09
Los Angeles Times

By Morley Winograd and Michael D. Hais

If the Republican Party thinks it has problems now, just wait. The party's incredibly poor performance among young voters in the 2008 election raises questions about the long-term competitiveness of the GOP.

The "millennials" -- the generation of Americans born between 1982 and 2003 -- now identify as Democrats by a ratio of 2 to 1. They are the first in four generations to contain more self-perceived liberals than conservatives.

And a recent Daily Kos tracking poll should send shudders down the spine of any Republican who understands how powerful a voting bloc this generation could become over the next decade.

Only 9% of millennials polled expressed a favorable opinion of the Republican Party. Only 7% were positive about the GOP's congressional leaders. By contrast, 65% of millennials had a favorable opinion of the Democratic Party, and a majority also approved of congressional Democrats.

Though many people question the political sophistication of the millennials, they have been instilled with egalitarian and participatory values by their parents since birth.

This child-rearing produced a generation that was wide open to the personal appeal and message of Barack Obama and his party. Moving forward, the initial preference of millennials for President Obama and the Democrats will remain in place for a lifetime unless Republicans can quickly adapt their message and find a messenger who can speak to this powerful new force in American politics.

Only 41% of all millennials were eligible to vote in 2008, yet their overwhelming support for Obama transformed his win from what would have been a squeaker into a solid victory. Obama's popular-vote margin over John McCain was about 9.5 million nationally; millennials accounted for nearly 7.6 million of those votes.

In the 2010 off-year election, half of millennials will be eligible to vote, representing about a fifth of the overall electorate. By 2012, 60% will be eligible to vote, and they could make up about a quarter of the American electorate when Obama runs for reelection. By 2020, when virtually all millennials will be over 18, they will represent 36% of the electorate and will completely dominate elections and the political agenda of America.

And it seems likely that this civic generation, like its "Greatest Generation" great-grandparents, will vote in big numbers. Turnout among voters under 30 has been rising steadily since millennials began to replace the alienated and more cynical Gen-Xers in this age group. From a low of 37% in 1996, turnout increased to 53% of all eligible millennials, and 59% in the key battleground states in 2008.

Their unity of opinion and their numbers will make millennials' preferences for economic activism, a non-intrusive approach to social issues by government at any level and a multilateral interventionism by America in foreign affairs the policy paths to political success during the next decade.

It is simply inconceivable that the Republican Party can craft a winning strategy between now and then that doesn't accommodate these ideas.

But so far, Republicans appear to be tone-deaf on the issues that millennials care about.

Millennials have been reared with a desire to serve their community, and the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act provides them an opportunity to do just that, while at the same time dealing with their single biggest financial worry -- the high cost of a college education. Unfortunately, all but 25 House Republicans voted against the bill, despite its co-sponsorship by Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah).

Millennials also are experiencing higher levels of unemployment than any other generation. They expect the federal government to take an active role in fixing that problem and support redistributing income if necessary. But the almost-unanimous Republican opposition to the "recovery" act helped convince millennials that only one party actually understood their problems and was prepared to act in accordance with their beliefs.

Polls consistently show millennials are more committed to environmental protection than any generation in American history, willing to sacrifice economic growth or endure higher prices in order to save the planet. Given the millennials' overwhelming concern with the environment, House Minority Leader John Boehner's comments recently that carbon dioxide isn't a real threat because "we all breathe it out" and, besides, "cows give out a lot of gas too," went beyond inanity into the realm of political suicide.

The only tentative Republican gesture to millennial power to date is the GOP's sudden fascination with a new social network platform, Twitter. By choosing Twitter -- with its limitations on content -- to connect to millennials, Republicans are actually demonstrating how little they know about this generation's commitment to engaging in the content-rich challenges of rebuilding the nation's civic institutions and national unification.

Republicans will need to find a new message and much better messengers than their last presidential ticket or their current congressional leaders if they want to truly connect with today's young voters. Failure to do so will leave Republicans, to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, locked in the dogmas of their quiet past, unable to think and therefore act anew.

Morley Winograd and Michael D. Hais are fellows of the think tanks NDN and the New Policy Institute and the coauthors of "Millennial Makeover: MySpace, YouTube, and the Future of American Politics."

If the Republican Party thinks it has problems now, just wait. The party's incredibly poor performance among young voters in the 2008 election raises questions about the long-term competitiveness of the GOP.

The Republican Party Ignores Young 'Millennials' at Its Peril

Monday Buzz: Much Ado about Millennials, Heritage Disagrees with Us (gasp!), and More

NDN fellows Morley and Mike had a big week in the media leading up to tomorrow's event in San Francisco, "The Progressive Politics of the Millennial Generation." They had a major op-ed published in Sunday's Los Angeles Times, entitled "The Republican Party Ignores Young 'Millennials' at Its Peril." It begins:

If the Republican Party thinks it has problems now, just wait. The party's incredibly poor performance among young voters in the 2008 election raises questions about the long-term competitiveness of the GOP.

The "millennials" -- the generation of Americans born between 1982 and 2003 -- now identify as Democrats by a ratio of 2 to 1. They are the first in four generations to contain more self-perceived liberals than conservatives.

Morley and Mike were quoted in the Boston Phoenix and the New York Observer on millennials. Here's an excerpt from the Phoenix:

Conventional wisdom suggests that getting bogged down over environmental legislation would distract Democrats from important issues like the economy and foreign policy. But that shows how little politicians have taken to heart the importance of the Millennials, say Michael Hais and Morley Winograd, co-authors of Millennial Makeover.

To this generation, this fight is not only about climate change — it is about creating green jobs and increasing national security by reducing dependence on foreign oil.

Simon's piece in the Huffington Post from last week had a particularly long tail, and was picked up by blogs on the left and the right, appearing in both MyDD and the Heritage Foundation's blog, "the Foundry."

Inauguration Is a 'Generational Touchstone'

1/20/09
San Francisco Chronicle

"This is their moment to demonstrate to America what they think America's future should be like," said Winograd...

Millennial Tremors

2/14/09
National Journal

Morley Winograd and Michael Hais, fellows at the Democratic advocacy group NDN and co-authors of the perceptive book Millennial Makeover, say that Millennials display the group-oriented values of a "civic generation"...

Politics of the Millennial Generation

Publish Date: 
3/22/06

In February of 2006, the New Politics Institute commissioned a survey of the up-and-coming Millennial Generation, those young people born in the 1980s and 1990s. This generation rivals the Baby Boom in scale and political potency, and is poised to dramatically alter the 21st century cultural and political landscape. The survey and accompanying analysis were prepared earlier this year by The Millennial Strategy Group at Frank N. Magid Associates, the nationally known media research and consulting firm. They probed 1400 Millennials – defined for this project as young people aged 13 through 28 – making key determinations about their political perspectives and comparing Millennial political attitudes and identifications with those of two older generations, Generation X (defined here as age 29 through 40), and Baby Boomers (ages 41 to 54).

This survey is the first in NPI’s Coming America series, a far-reaching look at key demographic transformations shaping the political landscape of the 21st century. It is framed by a complementary essay by NPI Fellow Peter Leyden, “The Greatest Generation Yet: Preparing for the Millennial Generation’s Impact on Politics.” We hope that progressive movement leaders will take note of these important statements about this rapidly emerging generation, whose civic-mindedness and social views could make them an enduring cornerstone of vital, 21st century progressivism.

Introduction

In February of 2006, the New Politics Institute commissioned a survey of the up-and-coming Millennial Generation, those young people born in the 1980s and 1990s. This generation rivals the Baby Boom in scale and political potency, and is poised to dramatically alter the 21st century cultural and political landscape. The survey and accompanying analysis were prepared earlier this year by The Millennial Strategy Group at Frank N. Magid Associates, the nationally known media research and consulting firm. They probed 1400 Millennials – defined for this project as young people aged 13 through 28 – making key determinations about their political perspectives and comparing Millennial political attitudes and identifications with those of two older generations, Generation X (defined here as age 29 through 40), and Baby Boomers (ages 41 to 54).

This survey is the first in NPI’s Coming America series, a far-reaching look at key demographic transformations shaping the political landscape of the 21st century. It is framed by a complementary essay by NPI Fellow Peter Leyden, “The Greatest Generation Yet: Preparing for the Millennial Generation’s Impact on Politics.” We hope that progressive movement leaders will take note of these important statements about this rapidly emerging generation, whose civic-mindedness and social views could make them an enduring cornerstone of vital, 21st century progressivism. For more information on the Coming America series visit www.newpolitics.net/comingamerica

Overview

This survey examined in detail the attitudes and behavior of three American generations — the Millennials, Gen-X'ers, and Baby Boomers — and, within the Millennials, three sub-generations, Teen Millennials, Transitional Millennials, and Cusp Millennials. Together the three generations consist of Americans 13-54 years old who were born from 1952-1993. Each of the three generations was born into a distinctive social milieu, was subject to distinctive child rearing practices, and faced a distinctive societal environment as it rose from infancy through childhood and into adulthood. According to the generational theorists William Strauss and Neil Howe, the particular experiences faced by each generation shaped the attitudes and behavior of that generation in a range of areas in distinction to those of the generations that preceded and followed.

Of present importance, the generations began to “come of age” and mature politically in decisively different periods ranging from the mid-196o's to the present. Our research suggests that, as in other areas of individual and societal life, the social and political environment into which each generation emerged influenced the political beliefs and perceptions of that generation. While it is true that generational variations in political attitudes, perceptions, and behavior are not as sharp as those based on strictly political variables such as self-perceived party identification and political ideology, generational political differences do exist. These generational political differences have the potential to influence election results, the style and tone of political discussion, and public policy direction as each succeeding generation emerges to shape and even dominate the political process as voters and office holders.

  • Teen Millennials (13-17 years old) seem to be strikingly shaped by coming of age politically in an “age of terror.” Their political identifications are still significantly unformed: about half have no clear party identification or ideological connection and those who do are about evenly divided among Republicans, Democrats, and Independents and liberals/progressives, conservatives and moderates. They are particularly concerned with “security” issues such as crime and terrorism and cannot be easily pigeonholed in their political attitudes. On some issue clusters (controlling terrorism and crime and “social” issues such as abortion and same sex marriage they seem to lean “conservative” and on others (government economic intervention, educational policy, and environmental protection) they tilt “liberal/progressive.” At this point, unlike other Millennial subgroups, they tend to be relatively skeptical about the political process, but they are generally more confident than other groups about how they will fare in the future, especially economically.
  • Transitional Millennials (18-22 years old) and Cusp Millennials (23-28 years old) started their political awareness during the Clinton years. While their political identifications are still not fully formed, the greatest number in both groups tend toward a Democratic party identification and a liberal/progressive ideological orientation, the Transitional Millennials more than the Cusp Millennials. These two older Millennial groups, especially the Transitional Millennials, are more likely than any others to hold opinions considered to be “liberal” or “progressive” across virtually all issue clusters: economic intervention, environmental protection, security, crime, education, and social issues. Finally, these two Millennial groups tend to have relatively positive and optimistic perceptions of the political process and their economic futures.
  • Gen-X'ers (29-40 years old) arose to political awareness during the Reagan-George H.W. Bush Republican ascendancy. Overall, Gen-X'ers, especially males, are more Republican in their party identification and conservative in their ideological orientation than any other generation. Concern with the economy and taxes ranks high for this group. The Gen-X'ers seem quite pragmatic in their attitudes on political issues and appear to position themselves on an almost issue-by-issue basis. They tend to favor strict punishment as the best means of handling crime and are more likely than any other group to believe the invasion of Iraq was correct. The Gen-X'ers seem broadly to favor a libertarian position on social issues such as abortion and same sex marriage and moderate (or pragmatic) positions on environmental protection, economic intervention, and educational policies. Consistent with this, they tend to fall between the relatively optimistic Millennials and the relatively pessimistic Baby Boomers in their overall perceptions of the current political environment, but lean toward the pessimism of the older generation. They are sharply more pessimistic about their economic future, but more positive about their family and religious lives, than the Millennials.
  • Baby Boomers (41-54 years old) first came to political awareness during the cultural turmoil and failed presidencies of the late 1960's and 1970's. Overall, the Baby Boomers are fairly evenly divided in their party and ideological identifications, a situation that is, in large measure, the residue of a gender gap between strongly Democratic women and more Republican and conservative men. The Baby Boomers seem to take a moralistic and value-oriented approach to politics. Consequently, they are highly concerned with almost all issues, but especially the economy, healthcare, changes in societal values and the Iraq war and they tend to hold strong and relatively extreme positions on most issues. But the Baby Boomers are not clearly either “liberal/progressive” or “conservative” across all issue clusters. On some (lifestyle and crime) they seem “conservative” and others (the Iraq war) they are relatively “liberal.” On still others (economic intervention and environmental protection) they are relatively polarized, to some extent along gender lines. Perhaps because they began to emerge politically during the turmoil and rocky politics of the 1960's and 1970's, the Baby Boomers hold more negative perceptions of the political process than other generations. Finally, the Baby Boomers are more pessimistic about their economic futures and more optimistic about their religious and family lives than any other generational group.

Detailed Findings: The Generations

THE TEEN MILLENNIALS

  • Vital statistics: 13-17 years old, born 1989-1993.
  • Strauss-Howe generational type: Hero. As a Millennial subgroup, they are presumably characterized by optimism, ability to achieve, and strong group orientation.
  • Dates of emerging political awareness: Still coming of age politically, but initial political awareness of most is occurring post-2000 in the “age of terror.”
  • Political identifications: To a large extent still unformed and up for grabs. Nearly half (47%) are unsure of their party identification and a majority (53%) can't state their political ideology. Among the rest, a near even division among Democrats (16%), Republicans (20%) and Independents (15%) and among liberals/progressives (15%), conservatives (18%), and moderates (14%).
  • Importance of specific political issues: Like all generations, Teen Millennials are currently strongly concerned with education and the Iraq war. However, probably because of their political emergence after 9/11, they are also concerned with “security” issues such as terrorism and crime (51% each) and the environment (46%).
  • Attitudes on specific political issues:Overall, the Teen Millennials cannot be simply be portrayed across all issues as either “liberal” or “conservative.” On some issue clusters (government economic intervention, education, and environmental protection) they are seem to lean “liberal/progressive” and on other issues (controlling terrorism and crime and “social” issues) they seem to tilt “conservative.” In their issue positions, as in their political identifications, the Teen Millennials seem to be up for grabs.— Terrorism and crime. Probably because of their concern with “security” and disorder, the Teen Millennials (unlike the two older Millennial subgroups, but similar to Gen-X'ers and Baby Boomers) tend to endorse strong policing and military efforts as means of confronting terrorism and crime. A plurality favor strict punishment (42%) rather than improving social conditions (35%) as a means of dealing with crime. Teen Millennials are least likely of all generational groups to regard the Iraq war as a “mistake” (46%) and to favor limited or no restrictions on monitoring the phone calls and e-mails of US residents.
    • “Social” issues. Teen Millennials tend to hold “traditional” positions on social issues such as abortion and same sex marriage. They are more likely than other generational grouping to favor limits on abortion and like the Gen-X'ers and Baby Boomers, but unlike Transitional and Cusp Millennials, to reject same sex marriage.
    • Environmental protection. Similar to the other Millennial subgroups, the Teen Millennials endorse environmental protection, even at the cost of economic growth, to a greater degree than do either Gen-X'ers or Baby Boomers.
    • Economic intervention. Like the other Millennial subgroups, a clear plurality (45%) of Teen Millennials favor governmental action to ameliorate economic differences among Americans.
    • Educational policies. More than any other generational grouping, Teen Millennials favor increased Federal funding for school construction (70%) and federal scholarships to pay for the post-secondary education of all qualified high school graduates (66%).
  • Attitudes toward the political process. No generational grouping can be classified as positive about the current workings of the political and economic systems, but Teen Millennials resemble the Gen-X'ers and Baby Boomers rather than their Transitional and Cusp Millennial cohorts in holding particularly negative attitudes about this. Majorities of Teen Millennials believe that special interests usually get their way in government (63%), politicians don't care what people like themselves think (66%), people who work hard and play by the rules never get ahead (54%), and politicians are too concerned with their party and not with doing what's right for the country (74%). However, consistent with their willingness to use government to lessen economic differences, more than any other generational group, they believe that it's unfair that some have so much when others have so little (62%).
  • Confidence about the future. While they are negative about the current political and economic processes, Teen Millennials are generally more confident than other generational groupings about how they will personally fare in the future, especially with regard to economic concerns such as having a fulfilling career (51%), good jobs (47%), being financially well-off (42%), having sufficient high quality education (53%) and being able to afford a home (43%), health care (33%), and retire comfortably (36%). At the same time, Teen Millennials are a bit less confident than the Gen-X'ers and Baby Boomers about achieving such spiritual and personal goals as having satisfying family and religious lives and clear values in the future.

THE TRANSITIONAL MILLENNIALS

  • Vital statistics: 18-22 years old, born 1984-1988
  • Strauss-Howe generational type: Hero. As a Millennial subgroup, presumably characterized by optimism, ability to achieve, and strong group orientation.
  • Dates of emerging political awareness: Approximately 1998-2002, during the second Clinton term.
  • Political identifications: Not fully formed, but the greatest number tend toward Democratic party ID and liberal/progressive ideology. About a third (30%) are unsure of their party identification and can't classify themselves ideologically (36%). However, among those who can, Democrats (26%) hold an edge over Republicans (18%) and Independents (22%) and liberals/progressives (29%) over conservatives and moderates (17% each).
  • Importance of specific political issues:Similar to other generations, Transitional Millennials are most strongly concerned with education and the Iraq war. In addition, majorities are also concerned with the economy (51%) and the environment (50%).
  • Attitudes on specific political issues: The Transitional Millennials are more likely than any other generational grouping to hold opinions considered to be liberal/progressive across virtually all issue clusters: economic intervention, environmental protection, security, crime, social issues, and education.
    • Terrorism and crime. A clear plurality of Transitional Millennials (44%) believes that improving social conditions rather than strict punishment (28%) is the most effective way of dealing with crime. A majority of them (60%) believe the Iraq war was a “mistake” and a plurality favor immediate US withdrawal from Iraq (32%). A small plurality of them (36%) reject electronic monitoring of US residents to fight terrorism under any circumstances and most of the rest believe this should occur only with court supervision.
    • “Social” issues. Transitional Millennials tend to reject “traditional” positions on social issues such as abortion and same sex marriage. They more often reject limits on abortion and accept alternative lifestyles than any other generational grouping.
    • Environmental protection. Transitional Millennials favor environmental protection, even at the cost of economic growth, to a greater extent than any other generational grouping.
    • Economic intervention. Along with the Teen Millennials, the Transitional Millennials are the grouping most likely to favor governmental action to reduce economic differences among Americans (45%).
    • Educational policies. More than any other generational grouping, except for Teen Millennials, the Transitional Millennials favor increased federal funding for school construction (68%) and federal scholarships for the post-secondary education of all qualified high school graduates (63%).
  • Attitudes toward the political process. Like other generational groupings, most Transitional Millennials are not positive about the operation of the political and economic processes. Still, Teen Millennials are more likely than any other group to reject the contentions that special interests get their way in government, that politicians don't care about ordinary people, and that politicians are more concerned with their party than the good of the entire country. A majority (55%) also agrees that it's unfair that some have so much while others have so little.
  • Confidence about the future. Like the other Millennial groups, the Transitional Millennials are relatively confident about their future economic status. They generally trail only the Teen Millennials in expecting to have fulfilling careers (49%), good jobs (42%), being financially well-off (39%), having enough high quality education (51%), and being able to afford a home (38%), health care (40%), and retire comfortably (38%). However, more than any other generational grouping, Transitional Millennials are relatively pessimistic about having satisfying religious and family lives and clear values in the future.

THE CUSP MILLENNIALS

  • Vital statistics: 23-28 years old, born 1978-1983.
  • Strauss-Howe generational type: Hero. As a Millennial subgroup, presumably characterized by optimism, ability to achieve, and strong group orientation.
  • Dates of emerging political awareness: Approximately 1992-1997, during first Clinton term.
  • Political identifications: More fully developed than other Millennial subgroups, but still less likely to have a clear party identification and ideological orientation than Gen-X'ers or Baby Boomers. Overall, the greatest numbers lean a bit toward the Democratic party and a liberal/progressive ideology. Among Cusp Millennials, there are somewhat more Democrats (26%) than Independents (25%) or Republicans (21%) and a greater number of liberals/progressive (28%) than conservatives and moderates (18% each).
  • Importance of specific political issues: As with most other groupings, education is a key concern of Cusp Millennials (64%). However, as a group that is beginning to enter the workforce, committed relationships and parenthood, healthcare and changed societal values (58% each) and the economy (55%) rank high in importance to them as well. All of these exceed the importance of such security-related concerns as the Iraq war, terrorism and crime to the Cusp Millennials.
  • Attitudes on specific political issues: The Cusp Millennials trail only the Transitional Millennials in tending toward liberal/progressive positions on most issue areas.
    • Terrorism and crime. A plurality of Cusp Millennials (43%) believes that improving social conditions instead of strict punishment (35%) is the best way of dealing with crime. A majority of them (56%) feel that the Iraq war was a mistake and a plurality (33%) favor immediate US withdrawal from Iraq. A plurality (37%) favor electronic monitoring of US residents only under strict court supervision, but almost as many reject monitoring in any circumstances (32%).
    • “Social” issues. Cusp Millennials fall between the more “liberal” Transitional Millennials and the more traditionally “conservative” Gen X'ers and Baby Boomers on social issues, but tend to lean toward their younger generational cohort. A plurality favors no limits on abortion (44%) and also endorses new lifestyles such as same sex marriage by a narrow margin over more traditional approaches (28% vs. 22%).
    • Environmental protection. Cusp Millennials favor environmental protection, even at the cost of economic growth, to a greater degree than any generational grouping other than the Transitional Millennials.
    • Economic intervention. Like other Millennial subgroups, the greatest number of Cusp Millennials favors governmental intervention to lessen economic disparities among Americans (43%).
    • Educational policies. Similar to the other Millennial subgroups, clear majorities of Cusp Millennials endorse increased funding for school construction (68%) and federal scholarships to pay for post-secondary education for all qualified high school graduates (54%).
  • Attitudes toward the political process.While most are not highly positive about the current workings of the political and economic systems, like the other Millennial subgroups, Cusp Millennials are more optimistic about this than the older Gen-X'ers and Baby Boomers. Cusp Millennials are less likely than their elders to believe that special interests get their way in government, that politicians don't care about ordinary people, and that politicians are more concerned with their party than the good of the whole country. Similar to other Millennials, a majority of Cusp Millennials (50%) agrees that it's unfair that some have so much while others have so little.
  • Confidence about the future.The Cusp Millennials, like other Millennials, are relatively confident about their future economic position. They are similar to both the Teen Millennials and the Transitional Millennials in anticipating fulfilling careers (43%), good jobs (44%), being financially well-off (40%), having enough high quality education (50%) and being able to afford a home (37%), health care (33%), and retire comfortably (33%). At the same time, Cusp Millennials are closer to the older generations in believing that they will have satisfying religious and family lives and clear values in the future.

THE GEN-XER'S

  • Vital Statistics: 29-40 years old, born 1966-1977
  • Strauss-Howe generational type: Nomad. Presumably characterized by greater orientation toward risk-taking, pragmatism, free agency, and more limited group affiliations.
  • Date of emerging political awareness: Approximately 1980-1991, during the Reagan-George H. W. Bush Republican ascendancy.
  • Political identifications: Some gender gap between more Democratic and liberal/progressive females and more Republican and conservative males. Overall, relatively more Republican (27%) and conservative (24%) than other generational groupings. Among male Gen-X'er's Republicans outnumber Democrats (28% vs. 24%) and conservatives outnumber liberals/progressives (27% vs. 24%).
  • Importance of specific political issues: Similar to other generations, Gen-X'ers perceive education and the Iraq War as important issues. However, they break with Millennials in that large majorities place great importance on the economy (64%) and taxes (62%).
  • Attitudes on specific political issues: Befitting their presumed pragmatism, the Gen-X'ers cannot be easily typecast across a range of specific issues and, instead, seem to adopt specific positions on almost an issue-by-issue basis.
    • Terrorism and crime. On several issues within this cluster, Gen-X'ers hold “conservative” positions. A clear plurality favors strict punishment (44%) rather than correcting social problems (36%) as the best approach to handling crime. More than any other generational grouping, Gen-X'ers believe that it was correct to invade Iraq. At the same time, a plurality of Gen-X'ers pragmatically believe in electronic monitoring of US residents only with strict court supervision rather than rejecting monitoring altogether or believing that it should occur without restrictions.
    • Social issues. Gen-X'ers seem broadly to favor a libertarian or laissez-faire approach on “social issues.” They are more likely than any other generational grouping to believe that there should be no limits placed on the right to abortions and a clear plurality (43%) believes that the government should not promote or reject any specific lifestyle in areas such as marriage.
    • Environmental protection. The Gen-X'ers broadly opt for a pragmatic position in the environmental issue area. More of them than in any other generation favor a moderate position midway between protecting the environment and promoting economic growth.
    • Economic intervention. Gen-X'ers are sharply divided in this issue area. A slight plurality (46%) believes that the government should provide education and opportunity to all and then let each person do as well as they can on their own. However, nearly as many (41%) say that the government should take more affirmative steps to lessen economic inequality.
    • Educational policies. The Gen-X'ers seem pragmatic in this issue cluster as well. Like the Millennials, a large majority favors a substantial increase in federal educational spending (66%). At the same time, unlike the Millennials, fewer than half of them (46%) endorse federal post-secondary education scholarships for all qualified high school graduates.
  • Attitudes toward the political process. Like most Americans, the Gen-X'ers are negative and suspicious of the current political and economic processes. Overall, they fall between the relative optimism of the Millennials and the pessimism of the Baby Boomers and tilt closer to the latter than the former in their present perceptions of the political process. Large majorities of Gen-X'ers believe that special interests get their way in government (69%), politicians don't care about ordinary people (68%), and that politicians are more concerned with their party than doing what's right for the country (76%).
  • Confidence about the future. There is a sharp break between the Gen-X'ers and the Millennials in their optimism about their future lives. On the one hand, the Gen-X'ers have relatively limited confidence in their future economic status. Only fairly small minorities of them believe that they will have fulfilling careers (38%), good jobs (37%), be financially well off (33%), and able to afford homes (38%), health care (28%), and retire comfortably (24%). A minority of Gen-X'ers is not confident that the quality and quantity of their education will allow them to succeed in life (43%). At the same time, most Gen-X'ers are positive about the spiritual and personal aspects of their lives in the future: religion (58%), family life (59%), and clear values (80%).

THE BABY BOOMERS

  • Vital Statistics: 41-54 years old, born 1952-1965
  • Strauss-Howe generational type: Prophet. Presumably characterized by being self-absorbed and very morally driven and value-oriented.
  • Date of emerging political awareness: Approximately 1966-1979, during the “failed” Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations and the cultural turmoil of that period.
  • Political identifications: Overall, fairly evenly divided in party identification among Democrats (33%), Republicans (26%), and Independents (23%) and in ideology among conservatives (26%), liberals/progressives (22%) and moderates (29%). However, a sharp gender gap between strongly Democratic women and more Republican and conservative men.
  • Importance of specific political issues.Perhaps because of their presumably “moralistic” and “value-oriented” orientation, large majorities of Baby Boomers express greater concern than any other generational grouping with virtually every specific issue examined in the survey. Overall, however, they express greatest concern with the economy (73%), healthcare (71%), changes in societal values (67%), and the Iraq war (64%).
  • Attitudes toward specific political issues. Befitting their value-driven rather than pragmatic approach, Baby Boomers are often characterized by taking strong, relatively extreme positions on issues. On some issue clusters (lifestyle issues and crime) this leads them toward more “conservative” positions and on others (the Iraq war) more “liberal” ones.
    • Terrorism and crime. Shaped by their moralistic viewpoint, Baby Boomers believe more decisively than other generational groupings in strict punishment (46%) rather than amelioration of societal problems (37%) as the best approach to dealing with crime. In particular, male Baby Boomers support a punitive approach to crime. They are more sharply divided than any other generation is their attitude toward electronic monitoring of US residents: a third (37%) favor monitoring only under strict court supervision and the rest are evenly divided in completely rejecting monitoring or favoring it without restrictions (28% each). Perhaps in a carryover from their youthful opposition to the Vietnam war, a large majority (58%) believe the Iraq war is a mistake and a third (31%) favor immediate withdrawal from Iraq.
    • Social issues. While in their youth Baby Boomers are thought of as a generation that flaunted traditional morality, in their maturity they support it with greater intensity than other generations. The greatest number of Baby Boomers (46%) favors a neutral governmental stance on lifestyle matters such as same sex marriage, but the rest endorse traditional rather than alternative lifestyles by a 2:1 ratio (32% vs. 16%). Overall, Baby Boomers appear to resemble other generations in their position of limited abortion. On both issues male Baby Boomers endorse traditional moral positions to a substantially greater degree than females.
    • Environmental protection. Like all other generational groups, most Baby Boomers endorse environmental protection at the cost of possible economic growth. However, they do so to a lesser extent than any other generation.
    • Economic intervention. Overall, Baby Boomers endorse government intervention to lessen economic disparities to a slightly smaller degree than other generations. Once again, however, gender differences are striking within the Baby Boomer cohort: a plurality of women support affirmative governmental policies that would reduce or eliminate economic inequalities, while most males oppose such policies.
    • Educational policies. Maybe because many are no longer supporting their own children or because of their relatively great concern with taxation, Baby Boomers are somewhat less likely than other generations to endorse increased federal spending on school construction and federal scholarships to provide post-secondary education for all qualified high school graduates. Consistent with other results, female Baby Boomers are more supportive of federal educational spending, especially for post-secondary scholarships.
  • Attitudes toward the political process. Perhaps as a result of their coming off age politically during the “failed” administrations of the 1960's and 1970's, Baby Boomers have substantially more negative and pessimistic perceptions of the political process than any other generational grouping. Large majorities of Baby Boomers agree that special interests get their way in government (76%), politicians don't care about ordinary people (70%), and that politicians are more concerned with their party than the entire country (82%). Contrary to their distinctive attitudes on specific policy-related issues, there are only scant gender variations on these broad systemic perceptions.
  • Confidence about the future. Baby Boomers are the least confident of all generations about their economic future and the most confident about their personal and spiritual lives. Only minorities of them are confident that they have had/will have fulfilling careers (35%), good jobs (34%), and financial security (34%). Fewer anticipate that they will be able to retire comfortably (24%) and afford quality health care (23%). Only 45% are satisfied with their education. At the same time, large majorities of Baby Boomers are satisfied that they have rich family lives (58%), satisfying religious lives (64%), and clear values to live by (85%).

Methodology

The research results outlined above were obtained in a larger national online survey conducted by Frank N. Magid Associates for an omnibus group of clients, including the New Politics Institute. The political portion of that survey was administered to a total sample of 2468 respondents 13-54 years old. These respondents were stratified to ensure that they accurately represent the total US population in gender, age, ethnic, and regional distribution. The political sample contained 1392 Millennials (person 13-28 years old), 537 Gen-X'ers (persons 29-40), and 539 Baby Boomers (person 41-54). The political sample was weighted to ensure that each of the generational groups was represented according to its actual contribution to the total U.S. population. The political survey was conducted January 5-23, 2006.

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