Data Matters

As the first article in this series pointed out, the two chief demographic components of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal coalition that enabled the Democratic Party to dominate American national politics from the early 1930s to the mid-1960s-the white South and the northern white working class-have been drifting away from the Democrats and toward the Republicans for the past four decades. But, America is a dynamic country with a growing, changing, and increasingly diverse population. And, the Democratic Party is in position to once again dominate U.S. politics around the same core values, but now with a far different voter coalition than the one assembled by FDR eight decades ago.

Recent Gallup and Pew polls indicate that the Democratic Party has a national party identification advantage of about ten percentage points over the Republicans.

 The voter coalition that underpins the Democratic Party's current party identification advantage-and which also elected Barack Obama President of the United States in 2008-reflects the America of today fully as much as FDR's coalition reflected the America of its era. While some of the components of the emerging Democratic coalition were a part of the New Deal coalition, others are brand new. If the white South and white working class have left the Democrats, other groups, some of which were decades from birth and others of which comprised only a negligible portion of the American electorate during the previous era of Democratic dominance, have joined. The major components of the new 21st Century Democratic coalition are:

• Young voters. Political scientists have long maintained that political realignments result from the emergence of new large generations of young Americans. The coming of age of the GI Generation (born 1901-1924) produced the New Deal realignment in the 1930s. The emergence of the sharply divided Baby Boomer Generation (born 1946-1964) ended that Democratic era in 1968 leading to forty years during which the Republican Party won the presidency in seven of ten elections. Today it is the Millennial Generation (born 1982-2003) and, to a lesser extent, younger members of Generation X (born 1965-1981) that are bringing about major political change. In 2008, Millennials voted for Barack Obama over John McCain by a greater than 2:1 margin (66% vs. 32%). Millennials also preferred Democratic congressional candidates to Republicans by about the same ratio (63% vs. 34%). A narrower majority of Gen-Xers (52% vs. 46%) also voted for Obama. By contrast, the forever-divided Boomers split their votes almost evenly between Obama and McCain, while the Silent Generation (born 1925-1945) opted for the Republican nominee (53% vs. 45%). The Democratic loyalties of America's youngest voters have persisted since Obama's election: in a mid-November 2009 Pew survey, Millennials identified as Democrats over Republicans by 58% to 19%. Gen-Xers did so by 51% to 38%. And, unlike older generations, Millennials are not sharply divided by gender and race: most male and white Millennials say they are Democrats, as do an overwhelming majority of the female and minority group members of the cohort.
• African-Americans. Blacks became charter members of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal coalition after seven decades of solid loyalty to the party of Lincoln. Black support for the Democrats became virtually unanimous in 1964, when the GOP nominated Senator Barry Goldwater, who earlier that year had voted against a civil rights bill that opened public accommodations to people of all races, as its presidential nominee. In 2008, not surprisingly, virtually all blacks (95%) voted for Barack Obama. But this was not much higher than black support for white Democratic presidential candidates had been in every election since the mid-1960s. Pew also indicates that African-Americans identify as Democrats over Republicans by an overwhelming 78% to 9% margin.
• Hispanics. Except for scattered regional pockets in places like Tampa, along the Rio Grande border, and New Mexico, Latinos were a negligible component of the American population both when FDR assembled the New Deal coalition and during the forty years afterward when the Democratic Party dominated U.S. politics. That is no longer the case. Hispanics now comprise 15% of the American population, a percentage expected to double within forty years. Latinos are now an increasingly crucial component of the new Democratic coalition. While a majority of them have voted for Democratic presidential candidates in every election since 1972, more than two-thirds (67%) voted for Barack Obama in 2008. With one exception (Bill Clinton's reelection in 1996), this was the largest percentage in any election since Latinos became a large enough component in the U.S. population to tabulate separately in presidential election exit polls. The support of Latinos for the Democratic Party is likely to be of long duration, a matter of increasing importance as the Latino share of the American electorate grows. According to Pew, more than six in ten Latinos (62%) identify as or lean to the Democrats; only 15% are Republicans.
• Women. Women gained the vote in 1920 and, for most of the time since then, there was virtually no difference in the partisanship of men and women. Most people married and most husbands and wives voted alike. However, as the divided Baby Boomer Generation became an increasing share of the electorate, a partisan "gender gap" developed in U.S. politics. Starting in 1980, the Democratic presidential vote of women was, on average, eight percentage points higher than that of men. The gap has only grown in recent elections as older, less divided, generations pass from the scene. Starting in 1996, a majority of women voted for Democratic presidential candidates while at least a plurality of men voted for Republicans. In 2008, Barack Obama enjoyed a 13-percentage point advantage among women (56% vs. 43%). Men divided their votes evenly between Obama and John McCain. This difference is reflected in party identification. Overall, according to Pew a clear majority of women are self-perceived Democrats (55% vs. 39% who claim to be Republican). By contrast, males are about evenly divided between the parties (41% Democrats and 38% Republicans). The narrow Democratic advantage among men is entirely a function of minority group males: a clear plurality of white males is Republican (44%, as compared to 38% who say they are Democrats). White women, by contrast, identify as Democrats over Republicans by ten percentage points (49% vs. 39%).
• The Northeast and West. American party coalitions have always contained a distinct regional component. Throughout most of U.S. history it was the Republican (or Whig) Northeast opposing the Democratic South. Today, as always, the South and Northeast continue to be pitted against one another, but the partisan leanings of each region have been reversed. The South has not given even a plurality of its presidential votes to a Democratic candidate since 1976 and white Southerners have not done so since at least 1964. By contrast, in 1984 the Northeast became the most Democratic region in presidential elections. It has given Democratic presidential candidates at least a plurality of its votes since 1992 and a majority since 1996. The West follows the Northeast in its Democratic loyalties. Since 1992 the West has given at least a plurality to Democratic candidates and in 2008 preferred Barack Obama against John McCain by 57% vs. 40%. The Northeast (56%) and West (47%) also contain the greatest percentages of Democratic party identifiers according to Pew.
• Highly educated Americans. In 1930, on the eve of the creation of the New Deal coalition, not even 5-percent of American adults were college graduates and an infinitesimal number had received any postgraduate education. By 1960, as that coalition entered its final years, the percentage of U.S. college graduates had crept up to nearly 8-percent. During the 1932-1968 era of Democratic dominance most of America's relatively few college graduates voted for and identified as Republicans. As recently as 1964, Gallup showed that a plurality (38%) of college graduates identified as Republicans, well above the percentages of those with high school (22%) or grade school (20%) education who did so. But things have changed. Now more than a quarter of Americans are college graduates and the New York Times exit poll indicated that 45% of those who voted for president in 2008 were college graduates, with 17% having at least some postgraduate education. More and more of these college graduates are Democrats. The percentage of college grads voting for a Democratic presidential candidate has steadily increased in each election since 1988 (from 37% to 50% in 2008) and those with postgraduate training have become the most strongly Democratic educational component in the electorate save for the now tiny number with less than a high school education. In 2008 college postgraduates voted for Barack Obama over John McCain by 58% to 40% and have remained Obama's strongest supporters during his presidency. In addition, a majority of college grads (51%) now identify with or lean to the Democratic Party in contrast to 37% who call themselves Republicans.

America is a much different nation now than it was 80 years ago when the New Deal coalition was first assembled. The Democratic Party has changed along with America and has put together a new voter coalition, one that is very different from the New Deal coalition, but also one with the potential to become the dominant force in U.S. politics just as FDR's coalition did so many decades ago.

The groups within the emerging Democratic coalition have clear political values. Most crucially they all favor an activist government that moves forcefully to resolve economic and societal problems in a way that protects and advances middle class Americans. These core Democratic values energized and held together the groups that comprised FDR's New Deal coalition. These same values will energize and bond the disparate groups that now comprise a new 21st century Democratic coalition.

But while a new coalition that can underpin renewed Democratic dominance has come into place, Democratic success in using it is by no means guaranteed. To do that, Democrats will have to have both the vision and the courage to see things as they are now and as they will be in the years ahead, not as they once were. If DC Democratic leaders and Democratic candidates across the nation are timid and fail to inspire and mobilize the emerging Democratic coalition by appealing to core Democratic values, the Democratic Party will manage to lose elections even in solidly Democratic places like Massachusetts. Democrats have a choice. They can either use their new majority coalition or they will lose it.

In spite of incorrect explanations like those of New York Times political columnist Matt Bai that the election of Massachusetts Republican Scott Brown to the U.S. Senate resulted from the actions of a fickle electorate dominated by political independents, the loss by Democrats of a long-held Senate seat is really a clear example of the old adage, "If you don't use it, you lose it." That is the lesson that Democrats should draw from last week's special election. The admittedly shocking event in Massachusetts notwithstanding, during the past decade the Democratic Party has assembled a new, and potentially majority, voter coalition. If the Democrats have the awareness and courage to use that coalition in New England and elsewhere across the United States they could dominate American politics and policy making for decades to come.

According to Bai, the American electorate, represented most recently by Massachusetts voters, seems to suffer from political ADD, flitting between "the latest offer" or "the newest best deal" in a society that is constantly "hitting the reset button." But, the victory of Scott Brown was not a matter of a fickle electorate alternating between the two parties in search of something new and different, or even a change in voting preference by Massachusetts independents. Rather, the outcome of last week's special election in Massachusetts stemmed primarily from reduced voter turnout among the state's Democrats. Bai and the Washington punditry might have known this had they even briefly reviewed the survey and election data that is freely and easily available on the Internet.

A posting by Charles Franklin on Pollster.com demonstrated the likelihood that reduced turnout among Massachusetts Democrats led to the victory of Republican Scott Brown and the defeat of Democrat Martha Coakley. Franklin indicates that Brown matched or exceeded John McCain's 2008 vote total in every jurisdiction while Coakley fell below Barack Obama's vote everywhere in the state. Overall, Brown's 1.17 million votes were 106% greater than McCain's 1.1 million in 2008. By contrast, Coakley's 1.06 million votes were only 56% of Obama's nearly 1.9 million votes in 2008. Franklin summarizes what happened this way: "... this doesn't mean that Brown got exactly McCain's voters since lots of individual switching could add up to these totals. But in the aggregate, Massachusetts looks exactly like it did in 2008 on the Republican side. On the Democratic side, a whole lot fewer voters."

Franklin is properly cautious about over-interpreting the aggregate election data. But a post-election poll (pdf) conducted by Washington Post, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Harvard School of Public Health confirms Franklin's aggregate level conclusions. The Post survey makes clear that the Massachusetts outcome was not the result of a wholesale flow of voters between the parties. The large majority of voters preferred the Senate candidate of the party for which they had voted in the 2008 presidential election. Virtually all Coakley voters (96%) chose Barack Obama and nearly seven in ten Brown supporters (68%) voted for John McCain in 2008.

But, the most unique and interesting aspect of the Post survey is that it interviewed a subsample of Senate race non-voters. While the non-voters fell between the Brown and Coakley voters in their attitudes, they were consistently much closer to the latter than the former on all items. Most tellingly, a large majority of non-voters who had voted in the 2008 presidential election (70%) voted for Barack Obama. Their attitudes toward the president have not declined significantly since his election. A large majority of non-voters (69%) approves of the job Barack Obama is doing as president. A majority (54%) also said they were either enthusiastic or satisfied with the policies of the Obama administration. By contrast, a majority of non-voters (56%) were dissatisfied or angry with the policies offered by congressional Republicans.

A clear majority of non-voters prefer a government that does more to solve problems rather than believing government is doing too many things better left to businesses and individuals (58% vs. 37%). This preference for activist government is reflected in the attitudes of non-voters about the proposed health care reforms developed by Congress and the Obama administration: a plurality of them supported rather than opposed that legislation (49% vs. 39%). Solid majorities of non-voters believed that the health care reform proposals would either leave themselves and their families, Massachusetts, and the country as a whole either better off or, at least, in the same condition as they are now. Only about one in five non-voters felt that the proposed health care reform program would hurt any of those groups.

The Post survey did not release demographic information and there were no media-sponsored exit polls last week in Massachusetts. Consequently, there is no foolproof empirical way to determine the exact demographic and political composition of those who voted in the special Senate election. But, a survey of likely voters (pdf) taken by Public Policy Polling (PPP) in the last weekend before the election provides a reasonable surrogate.

Of all pre-election surveys, the PPP poll most closely forecast the election outcome. It clearly indicated that the Massachusetts electorate last week contained significantly fewer young voters, minorities, Democratic identifiers and self-perceived liberals than it did in November 2008. All of these were groups that underpinned the president's 62% majority in Massachusetts.

In 2008, according to CNN's exit poll, 17% of the electorate was 18-29 years old and an additional 26% were 30-44. In the 2010 special election those numbers dropped to 8% and 20% respectively. In 2008, more than one in five Massachusetts voters (21%) were minority; last week only 13% were. In the 2008 presidential election, Democrats comprised a plurality of voters (43%). In 2010, just 39% of the electorate identified as Democrats. Finally, in 2008 about one in three voters (32%) was a self-perceived liberal; in 2010 less than a quarter (23%) were.

In reporting on its poll, PPP realized the difficulty that these numbers presented to Democratic candidate Martha Coakley: "Brown has a small advantage right now but special elections are volatile and Martha Coakley is still in this. She just needs to get more Democrats out to the polls." She didn't, and Scott Brown is now a Senator-elect.

What happened in Massachusetts has clear implications for Democrats across the United States. Martha Coakley and her out-of-touch strategists lost touch with what Barack Obama and his creative campaign did to rally a new winning coalition in 2008 and, as a result, lost an election in a state Democrats believed they could not possibly lose. Coakley lost not because the groups in that coalition turned against Barack Obama and the Democratic Party, but because turnout among those groups fell precipitously. If you don't use it, you lose it.

Update: This is the first in a three part series. You can find parts 2 and 3 here and here. 

If there is any single theme that has run through this column since its inception last June it is that the Democratic Party is America’s majority political party and that President Barack Obama and his Democratic congressional colleagues need to summon the courage to use that majority. Pew Research Center national surveys conducted since 1990 indicate that the Democrats’ party identification advantage over the Republicans grew exponentially, especially during the past decade. During the 1990s, the Democratic lead over the GOP was always less than ten percentage points. In 1994, the year in which Newt Gingrich’s revolution took control of Congress for his party, and in 2002, a year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Democrats’ lead vanished entirely. During the last six years of the George W. Bush administration and into the first year Barack Obama’s the Democratic advantage grew to 16 percentage points. By May 2009, a majority of the U.S. electorate identified with or leaned to the Democrats (52%) and only a third (36%) said they were Republicans.

But despite their legislative victories in passing the economic stimulus and health care reform in the Senate and House, recent polling now suggests that the Democratic majority may be on shaky ground. According to Gallup, by the end of 2009 the percentage of the electorate identifying with or leaning to the Democratic Party nationally fell below 50% for the first time since 2005. The most recent Pew national survey conducted early this month gives the Democrats a 49% to 39% edge in party ID. It certainly seemed that, as in physiology, by failing to use their strength, the Democrats may be on their way to losing it.

If so, it is in large part because D.C. Democrats, who came of age and learned the political lessons of an earlier era, have a very outdated perception of the electorate that continues to cloud their approach to policymaking. They seem unaware of or unwilling to use the new voter alignments that have given the Democratic Party the opportunity to dominate U.S. politics as it did for nearly 40 years after Franklin D. Roosevelt won the presidency in 1932. While the Democrats do have an opportunity to assemble a dominant majority just as they did nearly eight decades ago, that majority will be based on a very different voter coalition than the one that elected FDR and later Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson.

FDR’s New Deal coalition was diverse for its day. Catholic and Jewish Eastern, Central, and Southern European immigrants, and their children, were an important segment of the New Deal coalition, as were African-Americans in the big cities of the Northeast and Midwest. But, the coalition’s major components were Southern whites and the Northern white working class. The former had been the core of the Democratic Party since the times of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson. The latter had been primarily Republican since at least the election of William McKinley in 1896, if not Abraham Lincoln in 1860. But the Great Depression provided the opportunity for Democrats to enlist white workers as the second large building block of the New Deal coalition.

Both Southern whites and the Northern white working class have been slipping away from the Democratic Party for decades and, yet since at least the late 1960s, Democrats have focused much attention on somehow recreating the New Deal coalition. Among other things, this led to the truism that the only way the Democrats can, or at least could, win the presidency is by nominating a moderate Southerner. It is true that Barack Obama is the first Northern Democrat to win the White House since John F. Kennedy in 1960 and that, until Obama’s win in 2008, Southerners Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and Al Gore ran the strongest Democratic presidential campaigns in the previous four decades. However, the fact that Carter, Clinton, and Gore were all from the South and were Democrats is just about the only thing similar about the results of their campaigns.

Carter’s victory in 1976 came closest to reconstructing the New Deal coalition. Although a racial moderate, Carter, a self-professed born-again Christian, was certainly culturally Southern. He carried all of the former Confederate states except Virginia and he won the Border States of Missouri, Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware as well. At the same time, in a clear harbinger of things to come, Carter’s Republican opponent, Gerald Ford, actually won a majority of Southern white votes (52%). It was the votes of blacks that ultimately put Carter across the top in the South.

Bill Clinton won the presidency in 1992 while winning only four old Confederate states—Georgia, Louisiana, Arkansas, his home state, and Tennessee, that of his running mate. Clinton won only a third of Southern white votes (34%). Four years later, when Clinton swamped Bob Dole nationally, he carried only Arkansas, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Florida in the South and again received barely a third of the Southern white vote (36%).

In 2000, Al Gore received a popular vote plurality nationally against George W. Bush, but he won no Confederate states, including his own Tennessee, and lost the border states of Missouri, Kentucky, and West Virginia as well. In spite of his Southern roots, Gore won less than a third of the Southern white vote (31%), barely above John Kerry in 2004 (29%) and Barack Obama in 2008 (30%).

The white South has clearly not returned to the Democratic fold in the first year of the Obama presidency. Quite the contrary. In the most recent Daily Kos weekly tracking survey only a quarter of Southerners (27%) have a favorable attitude toward the president in contrast to 56% of the national electorate. Even fewer are positive about the Democratic Party (24%) as compared with 42% of all Americans. By contrast, a majority of Southerners (59%) have a favorable perception of the GOP in contrast with 30% nationally.

Just as the white South has been drifting away from the Democratic Party for decades, so has the white working class. Alan Abramowitz points out that the contribution of white manual workers to the electorate has declined from nearly half (47%) in the 1950s to a quarter (24%) in the first decade of the 21st century. These numbers are reflected in the Democratic Party’s presidential vote. During the 1950s a majority of the Democratic presidential vote (52%) were white manual workers, a number that fell to 23% in the decade that just ended. And, of crucial importance to the long-term composition of the Democratic voter coalition, the percentage of white manual workers who identified as Democrats declined from more than 60% in the 1950s and 1960s to barely 40% currently.

And, yet, the United States is a dynamic country with a changing population. Barack Obama won the presidency in 2008 and the Democrats became America’s majority political party in spite of declining support from the two key elements of the New Deal coalition—the white South and the white working class. Like Humpty Dumpty, the old alignment cannot be reassembled. But a new and different majority Democratic voter coalition is being formed. While it doesn’t have the same composition as the voter alignment that Franklin Roosevelt put together, it has the potential to dominate American politics just like FDR’s coalition did. To do that, today’s Democrats will have to have the vision and courage to appeal to and use the new coalition. We’ll detail the elements of the new Democratic alignment and how to appeal to them in the next edition of this column.

With the announced retirement of four Democratic Representatives during the past week, the continued inability of the Senate to pass healthcare reform legislation, an economy that, if it is no longer declining, seems at best to be moving sideways, and a President who remains personally appealing, but whose job performance numbers continue a slow downward drift, this is indeed a season of discontent for D.C. Democrats. Yet the situation is not completely bleak for the Democratic Party now and, most certainly, in the future.

In spite of their current difficulties, the Democrats remain America's majority party. While the numbers have fluctuated within normal statistical margins, throughout 2009 Pew research has indicated that the Democrats have held around a 1.5:1 party identification lead over the Republicans. During the course of the year between 48% and 53% of Americans identified with or leaned to the Democrats while between 35% and 40% identified with or leaned to the GOP. This Democratic advantage is significantly higher than it was in the Clinton years of the 1990s, when the Democrats' lead averaged about five percentage points. It is particularly large compared with 1994, the year the Democrats lost their congressional majority to the Gingrich revolution, when the two parties were tied in party ID at 44% each.

In fact, the competitive position of the Democratic Party now approaches what it was in the mid-1960s, when it was the unquestioned dominant force in U.S. politics. In a 1964 Gallup survey, conducted just prior to Lyndon Johnson's landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, the Democrats' party identification lead over the GOP was 49% to 24%. (Gallup did not ask the 24% of its respondents who said they were independents to which party they leaned).

Underpinning this rebound in the Democratic Party's competitive position is a major generational and ethnic transformation of America. It is a very different looking America now than it was in 1964. Borrowing a phrase from Fareed Zakaria, we have referred to this change in the U.S. population as the "Rise of the Rest" in America. Just as America has changed during the past four decades, so have the Democrats. It is a very different looking Democratic Party now than it was in 1964 and, as a result, the Democrats have already taken far better advantage of the Rise of the Rest than the Republicans.  Most important, the Democratic Party is far better positioned to benefit in the future from the opportunities presented by a changing nation.

• Ethnic and Racial Changes. In 1964, about ninety percent of Americans were white as were more than eight in ten (82%) of those who identified as Democrats. Of the one in ten Americans and the one in five Democrats who were not white, all were labeled "Negroes" in the Gallup survey. Five decades ago, Latinos and Asians, to say nothing of persons of mixed race, were a negligible part of the electorate and not separately designated in the survey research of the era. Today the "minority" contribution to America's population has nearly tripled and non-Caucasians comprise about four in ten Democratic identifiers. And, this is only a harbinger of things to come: according to the Census Bureau, by mid-century the United States will become a "majority-minority" country. Within an increasingly diverse nation, however, now, as in the mid-1960s, more than 95% of Republicans are white.
• Changes in Gender Roles. In 1964, only a minority of women worked outside the home and almost all women married by the time they were 25. Betty Friedan had published The Feminine Mystique just a year earlier and "women's liberation" would have been an unknown and meaningless term to almost everyone in America, male or female, other than perhaps Ms. Friedan herself. The National Organization for Women was not founded for another two years. In that societal environment, there was no gender gap in U.S. politics. The party identifications of both women and women were essentially identical, wives and husbands almost invariably identified with the same political party, and both party's identifiers were evenly divided between the sexes. Now women, many of whom are unmarried or minority, comprise more than six in ten Democratic identifiers. By contrast, a slight majority of Republicans are males. Virtually all of the women who do call themselves Republican are white and most are married.
• Changes in Educational Attainment. In 1964, nearly half of the electorate had only high school education. An additional third had gone no further than grade school. Just one in five were college graduates. There were significant differences in the educational attainment of Democratic and Republican identifiers. Almost nine in ten Democrats (86%) had no more than high school education. By contrast, twice the percentage of Republicans as Democrats were college graduates (30% vs. 14%). Now, a majority of Americans has at least some college exposure and nearly three in ten are college graduates. The educational gap between the two parties has virtually disappeared. While, as in 1964, about 30% of Republican identifiers are college graduates, the percentage of college graduates among Democrats has doubled from 14% to 28%.
• The Rise of New Generations. Most of the generational archetypes that comprise the American electorate today had not yet entered it in 1964. The oldest Baby Boomers (born 1946-1964) would not reach voting age-at that time, 21-until 1968 and no one from Generation X (born 1965-1981) and the Millennial Generation (born 1982-2003) had even been born. The youngest voters of 1964 were members of the Silent Generation (born 1925-1945). But, the 1964 electorate was really dominated by the GI Generation (born 1901-1924), the generation of the New Deal and World War II, and the Lost Generation (born 1883-1900), that primarily came of age around World War I and in the 1920s. The GI Generation formed the core of the New Deal coalition that elected Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy and was about to return Lyndon Johnson to the White House with a record margin. About half of the 1964 Democrats were members of the GI Generation, who identified with that party by a 2:1 margin. The Lost Generation was the last of the generations that allowed the GOP to dominate American politics from the Civil War to the Great Depression and half of 1964 Republican identifiers were from what was by then a generation of senior citizens.

Today, with a different generational configuration than in 1964, the GOP still skews relatively old and the Democrats young.  Virtually all of the Lost Generation and most of the GI Generation has died. The youngest voters of 1964, the Silent Generation, are the seniors of today and the oldest Baby Boomers, none of whom were of voting age in 1964, are now reaching retirement age. Generation X and increasingly the Millennial Generation have joined the electorate.

But it isn't simply chronological age difference that will work to the Democrats' advantage. Young people are not always Democrats. When the Baby Boomers were young, and even more so today, they were divided between the two parties along ideological and gender lines. The oldest Gen Xers came of age just in time to vote in very large numbers for Ronald Reagan and remain the most staunchly Republican age cohort in the electorate.

Millennials are of the same "civic" generational archetype as was the GI Generation. Similar to other civic generations, Millennials are group-oriented institution builders who tend to favor societal or governmental responses to the nation's problems. Like the GI Generation before them, Millennials overwhelmingly identify as Democrats over Republicans (58% vs. 19% in a November 2009 Pew survey). 

In 2008, only 40% of Millennials were eligible to vote and they comprised about 17% of the American electorate. When Barack Obama runs for reelection in 2012, about 60% of Millennials will be of voting age and one in four voters will be a Millennial. By 2020, when virtually all of them will be able to vote, more than a third of the electorate (36%) will come from the Millennial Generation. As the largest (95 million) and most ethnically diverse generation in U.S. history-40% of Millennials are non-white-this should benefit the Democratic Party at least as much over the next three or four decades as did the attachment of the GI Generation to the Democrats in the middle-third of the 20th Century.

The United States is a changed and continually changing nation. Taken together, these changes have made America a more diverse and more open nation. To a large extent these changes occurred because of Democratic efforts over Republican opposition. This should let the Democratic Party face the future with confidence and courage rather than the fear and paralysis that seems to be gripping it a year after the election of Barack Obama and a large congressional majority. But, the Democratic Party's opportunities cannot be taken for granted. The first step in taking advantage of those opportunities should be looking toward the America that is and will be and not looking back to the country that was.

In a blog originally written just after President Barack Obama spoke to the Muslim world last June in Cairo and reposted last week following the president's acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, NDN President Simon Rosenberg said that both events left him hopeful and inspired because they stem from what Simon calls the "central dynamic driving global politics today." Fareed Zakaria labels this dynamic "the rise of the rest." A big part of this change is both ethnic and generational. It involves the full emergence of people who are not of white European descent as full actors in the center of the world stage and not merely bit players on the wings. Many of these are young members of a global Millennial Generation (the American version of which was born 1982-2003). The "rise of the rest" is reflected in survey research conducted both in the United States and around the world since Barack Obama was elected president in 2008. 

Shortly after the President's Cairo speech, the Pew Research Center released the results of its annual Global Attitudes Project. This major survey consisted of interviews with large samples (700+ per country and more than 26,000 overall) in 25 countries across the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Perhaps the most striking finding, one occurring in almost every country, was a sharp improvement in attitudes and perceptions toward the United States, its people, and its policies between 2008, the last year of the Bush presidency, and 2009, the first year of the Obama administration. In the 2009 survey, favorable attitudes toward the United States rose in 20 of 24 nations. The number of countries in which a majority now held a positive opinion of America rose from 9 to 14. Positive attitudes toward the American people increased in most countries to levels not seen since 2002, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The improved perceptions of America and its people have led to greater acceptance of U.S. foreign policy goals and the steps being taken to achieve them. The sense that the United States acts unilaterally in world affairs declined decisively with the coming of the Obama presidency: in 18 of 25 countries a greater number perceived in 2009 that America would consider the interests of their nation in its actions than had believed this in 2007. Two years ago in only five of the countries did majorities favor U.S. anti-terrorist activities. That number rose to 15 this year. Most important, citizens in 17 countries believed that their own country should take a larger role in fighting international terrorism.

There can be little doubt that the improved attitudes toward the United States and its policies stem directly from the election and inauguration of Barack Obama. In 14 of 24 countries a majority said that Obama's election made them more favorable toward the United States. In an additional five nations, a plurality, if not a majority, made that claim. Even more impressive, in virtually all of the countries (23) a greater number said that they had more confidence in President Obama than had said this about President Bush a year earlier. Only in Israel was confidence in Obama less than it was in Bush, falling by a statistically insignificant percentage point. More specifically, majorities in most countries believe that Obama will take steps to deal with climate change and be fair in the Middle East. Only in Muslim countries (but not Israel) do the greatest number have doubts about the president's intentions in the latter area.

The "rise of the rest" is clearly having an impact on political attitudes and behavior in the United States as well. Since mid-Summer a point of never-ending attention within the inside-the-Beltway punditry has been the decline in Barack Obama's job approval ratings since he took office in January. A mid-November Gallup survey put the president's approval mark at 49%, an insignificant one-point less than it is in the most recent Gallup tracking poll. That score is, indeed, 17 percentage points lower than it was in the first Gallup surveys conducted immediately after Obama was inaugurated.

The article describing this survey was headlined, "Obama's approval slide finds whites down to 39%."  Indeed, the drop in the president's job performance marks since his inauguration was greatest among Republicans (down 24 points), whites (down 22 points), self-perceived conservatives and seniors (down 19 points each). However, Obama lost all of these groups to John McCain in 2008 and, as a result, none could be considered a real support group or member of the president's electoral coalition.

In fact, the better point of comparison may not be the president's job performance marks immediately after he took office, but the results of the 2008 election. Looked at from that perspective, the president's approval rating is within a few points overall, and among key demographics, of his vote percentage a year ago. In particular, his approval marks remain at high levels among groups won by Obama last year, especially his fellow Democrats and liberals (82% each), Millennials (61%), African-Americans (91%), and Latinos (70%).

Obama's high and virtually unchanged support within his own coalition points to the key importance of groups that will, in coming years, comprise an increasing share of the U.S. population and electorate-minorities, especially Latinos, and Millennials, a generational cohort that is 40% non-Caucasian. Census Bureau estimates indicate that, together, "minority" groups will become a majority in America around 2042. By 2020, more than one in three voters will be Millennials. These groups, along with women, have become the base of the Democratic Party and have the potential to form the bedrock on which will be built an enduring Democratic majority that could dominate American politics for decades to come.

More recently, however, while these key groups are no less positive about Barack Obama and the Democratic Party than they were a year ago, the intensity of their support appears much reduced. The most recent Daily Kos weekly tracking poll indicates that a preference for Democrats over Republicans in the 2010 mid-term elections remains overwhelming among Millennials (56%-5%), African-Americans (69%-5%), Latinos (49%-26%) and women (43%-20%). At the same time, only a minority of Millennials (39%), African-Americans (32%), and Latinos (42%), and barely half of women (51%) say they are likely to vote next November.

Overseas, the "rise of the rest" is contributing to more positive attitudes toward the United States and its policies, a trend based to a large extent on favorable opinions of Barack Obama. At home it was the primary demographic factor underpinning the president's winning of the White House and the Democratic Party's enhanced congressional majority in 2008. It is the way to continued Democratic success in the future. But the Obama administration and the Democrats have a more immediate concern: rekindling the enthusiasm of these key support groups and making the "rise of the rest" the center piece of their 2010 campaign.

Finally passing meaningful health care reform will help, as will continued efforts to improve employment and educational opportunities for all Americans, but especially Millennials. If Democrats succeed in doing that they will continue to take advantage of a dynamic that is continuing to shape events in America and around the world.

Even for someone as personally cautious as he appears to be, President Barack Obama's decision about the future direction of U.S. policy in Afghanistan has been a long time coming. This has produced charges that he is "dithering" from his Republican opponents and feelings of unease from his Democratic allies. Still, the president's caution is understandable. What he decides now will directly impact the lives of the young Americans who serve in the nation's armed forces, have important national security and economic ramifications, and influence his party's and his own election chances in 2010 and 2012.  Given the stakes, hasty decision-making is really in no one's best interests.

Moreover, as a student of history, Obama certainly knows that caution is a useful watchword when it comes to Afghanistan. It has successfully resisted foreign incursions since the time of Alexander the Great, who had good reason to call it the "Graveyard of Empires."

Unfortunately, this is one matter on which public opinion offers the president little clear guidance to inform his decision-making. Recent survey results on the issue are almost as complex, contradictory, and cloudy as are events in Afghanistan itself. If anything, the murky polls on the issue go a long way toward explaining why President Obama is moving so slowly in making and announcing a decision.

At this point, only one thing is unambiguous: since mid-Summer Obama's personal favorability, his job performance ratings, and his marks on most specific issues such as health care reform, the economy, and foreign policy have generally fluctuated within narrow boundaries. By contrast, he has lost ground on his handling of the Afghanistan situation across all public surveys.

An early November Pew survey is typical: since July the president's rating for his handling of the economy and energy policy is up four percentage points each and for health care up one. His scores for dealing with foreign policy and the budget deficit are down by three points and one point respectively. However, his rating for handling Afghanistan dropped by eleven points over the same period (from 47% to 36%).

In large part, of course, President Obama is being punished for appearing indecisive. The electorate appreciates certainty rather than uncertainty. Once he does determine and announce what his administration's Afghan policy is, his marks will almost certainly rise, at least in the short run, regardless of what that policy is. It's the longer run that's going to be more difficult.

One major concern is that Americans increasingly question the correctness of U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan. At this point, slightly more Americans endorse our military efforts in Afghanistan than reject them.  However, support for the mission is narrow and declining. According to Pew, a slight majority (56%) says that the initial decision to use force in Afghanistan was right, but that number is down from 64% in January. Similarly, a November Quinnipiac survey indicates that a slight plurality (48%) believes that the U.S. is doing the right thing in fighting the war in Afghanistan, down from 52% in October.

Given the sharp division about the efficacy of the mission it is not surprising that the public is equally divided about what U.S. Afghan policy should be going forward. Exactly how divided depends on the way pollsters pose the question.

Pew simply asked if U.S. troop levels should be increased, decreased, or kept at current levels over the next year. A slight plurality (40%) want them decreased, while 32% favor an increase and 19% want the number of American troops in Afghanistan to remain the same as now. Those percentages are essentially unchanged since the beginning of 2009.

The Quinnipiac question informed respondents that "General Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, has asked President Obama to send 40,000 additional combat troops" and asked if the president should send those forces or not. When the matter is specifically linked to an appealing military figure, a slight plurality (47% vs. 42%) endorses committing more American troops to Afghanistan. Even so, a majority (54%) is unwilling to have "large numbers" of U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan for more than two years, a number that has increased by six points since October. Only a quarter (27%) is willing to make the commitment of American forces to Afghanistan open-ended, for "as long as it takes."

Adding to the difficulty and complexity of President Obama's decision-making is the fact that the very groups within the electorate that most decisively contributed to his election win a year ago and most strongly support his other policy initiatives now-Millennials (young voters 18-27), minorities, and his fellow Democrats-are most resistant to sending additional troops to Afghanistan. In the Pew survey, most Millennials (53%) and Democratic identifiers (51%) want American forces in Afghanistan to be decreased during the next year. According to Quinnipiac, large majorities of Democrats (61%), African-Americans (73%), and Hispanics (60%) oppose sending the 40,000 new troops to Afghanistan that General McChrystal has requested. By contrast, in both surveys, most Republicans favor committing more forces to the Afghan conflict. The implications of this unique public opinion configuration for President Obama's domestic policy goals, such as health care reform, are worrisome and will take all of his strong communication skills to overcome.

One thing that may help him to do that is to properly define why America is in Afghanistan in the first place. Quinnipiac separately asked if "eliminating the threat from terrorists" and "establishing a stable democratic government" are worthwhile goals for which American troops would "fight and possibly die in Afghanistan." Clear majorities endorsed the former goal (65%) and rejected the latter (54%), although, unfortunately, most Americans are not confident that the United States will ultimately achieve either goal. 

The stakes in Afghanistan are high for America and President Barack Obama. The administrations of the last three presidents to become involved in extended Asian land wars-Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, and George W. Bush-ended badly. The president needs to get his decision about where to go from here right the first time. Unfortunately, public opinion offers little clear guidance. The electorate is evenly divided and increasingly pessimistic about both the American mission in Afghanistan and the strategic and tactical options available to deal with events there. Uniquely, the groups that support him most strongly electorally and in other policy areas are most opposed to expanded military efforts in Afghanistan. Yet, failure to act militarily may conflict with the president's overriding responsibilities as commander-in-chief and decisions taken or not taken now may have unforeseen consequences in the future. So take your time in deciding what to do, Mr. President-- it could be the most important decision you make.

After initially declaring last Tuesday night that the 2009 off-year elections were a negative referendum on President Obama, the DC punditry, especially the cable news channels, took a look at the actual election results and their own exit poll data, reversed field, and decided that the day’s events were not really all about Barack.  In fact, because the returns contained something to please almost everyone—Republican gubernatorial victories in Virginia and New Jersey and Democratic congressional wins in upstate New York and northern California—there was little consensus within the media and among politicians about the partisan implications of the day’s results.

But there was one common thread running through the returns: the state of the economy was decisive in the choices of many voters. Pluralities told exit poll interviewers in Virginia (47%), New Jersey (32%) and New York City (40%) that “the economy and jobs” was the single most important issue shaping their ballot preferences in this year’s elections. If the 2009 elections had any meaning at all it was to warn Washington that it must focus on the economy, especially employment, and take decisive and affirmative steps to deal with both the causes and ravages of the greatest economic downturn in the U.S. since the Great Depression, doing so in a way that clearly puts the needs of middle class and working Americans above the concerns of financial elites. 

All recent national polls confirm the economic concerns of Virginia, New Jersey, and New York City voters. An October Pew survey shows that virtually everyone (91%) rates the current state of the economy as only fair or poor, with a decisive plurality (48%) saying it is poor. (http://people-press.org/report/551/) A survey conducted in the same time frame for the Wall Street Journal by Democrat Peter Hart and Republican Bill McInturff indicates that 80% of Americans are at least somewhat dissatisfied with the current state of the U.S. economy; half (49%) are very dissatisfied. Most also believe that the economy still has a ways to go before it hits bottom (58%). There is even greater pessimism about jobs: about two-thirds (63%) believe that the level of unemployment will drop even further before it rebounds. Moreover, while some point to the recent jump in stock prices as an indication that hard times are ending, a solid majority (64%) say that the gains in the Dow Jones average have little effect on their own economic well-being. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/wsjnbc-10272009.pdf

The Pew study also demonstrates the major impact that the recession has had on individual Americans and their families. A majority (60%) rated their own financial situation as only fair or poor. Just 38% said their personal finances were in excellent or good shape. These perceptions are based primarily on a widespread concern with employment. Nearly half (42%) indicated that there has been a time during the past year when they or someone else in their household was unemployed and eight in ten believe that jobs are difficult to find in their community. The problem was particularly acute among young members of the Millennial Generation (18-27 year olds), 61% of whom said that they or someone close to them was jobless recently.  As a result, a clear plurality (46%) says that the “job situation” rather than rising prices (27%), problems in the financial markets (14%) and declining real estate values (7%) is their major economic worry.
While many on the conservative side of the political spectrum and Republican side of the congressional aisle favor a hands-off approach, most Americans believe decisive federal government action is needed to restore economic vitality and produce jobs. According to the Wall Street Journal poll, 63% believe that the government has either done the right amount or not enough to improve economic conditions. A plurality (36%), in fact, would like to see the government take even bolder steps. Only 30% feel that the government has been too involved in the economy.

One thing that most Americans believe would strengthen the economy and prevent future downturns is additional regulation of the financial institutions that caused the recession. A large majority (70%) perceives that the government has made little or no progress in fixing the financial practices that produced the crisis. That failure clearly did not stem from public resistance to reform. According to Pew, a majority (54%) says that increased government regulation of major financial companies is a good idea, with two-thirds of those agreeing strongly. Only 38% believe that greater regulation of the financial industry is a bad idea.

Most also believe the government should invest in and rebuild the country’s infrastructure. A majority (70%) agrees that “the government spending billions on roads, bridges, and other public works projects” has been good for the economy. Support for infrastructure spending is widespread in all demographics and across party lines. This approach seems to be a “no-brainer” that will enhance short-term employment among those who are most severely affected by the recession and long-term economic growth.

The American people are hurting. They have asked their government to act decisively on their behalf. The only remaining question is whether the Obama administration and congressional Democrats have the will to do so. If they do not, meaningful interpretations of the 2010 and 2012 elections will not be nearly as hard to find as they were this year.

Michael D. Hais is an NDN Fellow and co-author, with Morley Winograd, of Millennial Makeover: MySpace, You Tube, and the Future of American Politics, named one of the ten favorite books of 2008 by the New York Times.

The current attentions of the Obama administration and the progressive political community, not surprisingly, are focused on putting the U.S. economy fully back on course, passing meaningful health care reform, determining ways to deal effectively with a worsening military situation in Afghanistan, and the looming threat of a nuclear Iran. At the same time, the results of several recent polls conducted in both Mexico and the United States suggest that this is also a propitious moment to move immigration reform to the front burner, not simply because it is a positive value in its own right, but because of its potential to impact other issues of concern.

A national survey conducted in Mexico by the Pew Global Attitudes Project points to rising economic and social pressures within that country that make emigration to the United States an increasingly appealing alternative for Mexicans, but also to improved attitudes toward America and its leaders that should encourage Mexico to endorse positive steps taken by the United States takes to reform its immigration policies.

According to Pew, large majorities of Mexicans believe that crime (81%), economic problems (75%), illegal drugs (73%), and political corruption (68%) are very big problems facing their nation. Most everyone else perceives these to be at least minor problems. All of these numbers, especially the concern with crime and drugs, have increased significantly since Pew's last survey of Mexico in 2007. In addition, only about a third believe that the courts (37%) and police (35%) have a positive impact on the country. A slight majority (51%) claims that they had to offer a gift or bribe to an official within the past year in order to receive a government service or document. Overall, more than three-quarters (78%) are now dissatisfied with Mexico's direction, up ten percentage points over the past year.

It is true that not all of the survey results are negative. Solid majorities give the Mexican military (77%), President Felipe Calderon (75%), the national government (72%), and the media (68%) favorable evaluations. Virtually everyone supports Mexico's aggressive war against drug traffickers (83%) and most also believe that the country is making real progress in that effort (66%). Additionally, a large majority (76%) approve of the Mexican government's handling of the H1N1 (swine flu) outbreak that began in the country last spring.

Still, a significant number of Mexicans are unhappy enough with conditions in their country that they would consider moving elsewhere. A clear majority (57%) believe that Mexicans who move to the United States have a better life in America than in Mexico, a number that is up by six-percentage points over the past two years. Those who have friends or relatives in the States with whom they communicate or visit regularly especially feel that way and most of those (70%) also believe that their acquaintances have "achieved their goals" in emigrating north of the border. As a result, a third of Mexicans (33%) say that, if they had the means or opportunity, they would go to live in the United States. Of these, more than half (18% of all respondents) says they would do so without "authorization."

Of course, relatively few of those saying they would move to the United States will actually cross the border. It is very easy for someone to tell a survey interviewer that they are willing to take such a major step. It is far more difficult to actually do so.  And, in fact, as a result of America's own economic difficulties immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries, both documented and undocumented has declined over the past year. Still, if even five- or ten percent of those Mexicans indicating an interest and willingness to move to the U.S. were to do that it would represent between 2 and 4.5 million people, a number that would have significant impact on the societies, economies, public safety, and national security of both nations.

Given this, reform of U.S. immigration policies is crucial. This reform must both regularize the flow of new immigrants into the United States and clarify the status of those who are already here, and it must do so consistent with the most humane and tolerant American and progressive values.

Fortunately, there are clear indications that both Mexicans and Americans may be open to such an approach. Since the election and inauguration of Barack Obama Mexican attitudes toward the United States and willingness to cooperate with it have improved significantly. A majority of Mexicans have confidence that President Obama will do the right thing in world affairs (55%). This is well above the 16% who had similar confidence in George W. Bush in the last year of his administration. It is also far better than the scant 9% who have confidence in Venezuela's America-baiting president, Hugo Chavez. As a result, the number of Mexicans who have favorable impressions of the U.S. has risen from 47% in 2008 to 69% now; the highest level since Pew first researched the matter in 1999. Most Mexicans also support a range of interactions between the two countries. Three-quarters (76%) say that the economic ties linking Mexico and the United States are a good thing, something that benefits both nations. Moreover, a large majority supports U.S. assistance in training the Mexican police and military (78%) and providing weapons and money (63%) to aid Mexico in its war against drugs. Almost a third (30%) would go so far as to permit the deployment of American troops in Mexico to assist in the anti-drug effort.

Finally, while many Mexicans are personally willing to move to the U.S. and believe that the experiences of their countrymen in America have been good, most also sense that continued large-scale emigration may not be in Mexico's best interests. An overwhelming 81% believe that the fact many people leave Mexico for jobs elsewhere is a significant problem for their country and a plurality (48%) say it is bad for Mexico that so many of its citizens live in the United States.

Pew research also indicates an increased willingness north of the border to support humane and progressive immigration reform. Led by the emerging Millennials (born 1982-2003), a generation that is 40% non-Caucasian, and among which one in five members has at least one immigrant parent, the percentage who support increased restrictions and controls on immigration into the United States has declined from 80% in 2002 to 73% now. Millennials in particular reject the contention that the increased number of newcomers from other countries threatens traditional American customs and values (35% vs. 55% for older generations). Most important, support for an immigration reform policy that would provide a way for undocumented immigrants currently in the U.S. to gain legal citizenship by passing a background check, paying a fine, and holding a job increased from 58% in 2007 to 63% this year.

While the political community's current focus on economic recovery, health care reform, Afghanistan and Iran is certainly understandable, the need for immigration reform remains. It is crucial that progressives take the lead on this issue. As Joe Wilson's "you lie" reaction to the president's assurances that health care reforms would not apply to undocumented immigrants demonstrates, the radical right is more than willing to exploit fear and prejudice on this issue and to use them in its efforts to derail key items on the Democratic agenda. Fortunately, recent polling suggests that the time is ripe and the public on both sides of the border receptive to progressive policies that would finally reform America's broken immigration system.

After enduring the rancorous dog days of August, last week was a good one for President Obama. It began with his talk to America's young people. Faced with charges from paranoid conservatives and Republicans that he was attempting to indoctrinate school children with a radical and foreign message, the president simply asked kids to study hard, stay in school, get good grades, and be unwilling to accept failure. His words likely inspired many of the students to whom they were addressed while at the same time making his opponents appear silly, if not downright bizarre.

But the capstone of the president's week was his address to a joint session of Congress in which he detailed his plan to reform America's health care system. In his speech, President Obama described his plan's benefits, addressed the legitimate concerns of Americans about the major changes the plan would bring, rebutted the distorted charges of his opponents, and inspired his allies with an emotional appeal to enact the plan as a posthumous memorial to Senator Ted Kennedy.

The end result was a rise in Obama's poll numbers. The first to report were CNN and the Democracy Corps, both of which questioned voters before the president's congressional address and then again immediately afterward. Because, not surprisingly, Democrats were more likely to watch Obama's speech than Republicans, the CNN survey somewhat oversampled Democratic identifiers. Even so, considering that Obama's approval ratings had declined seriously among Democrats over the summer, the results were encouraging for the president. CNN found that three-quarters (77%) of those who watched the speech had a positive reaction to it overall, with 56% being very positive.  Nearly as many (72%) believed that Obama clearly stated the goals for his health care plan in his speech. As a result, the president's numbers improved significantly on a number of key items. After the address, 70% believed that Barack Obama's policies would move the country in the right direction as compared with 60% who felt that way before. Most important, the number favoring the president's health care reform plan rose sharply to 67% from 53%.

The Democracy Corps used electronic dials to gauge the perceptions of 50 "independent and weak partisan" voters in Denver before, during, and immediately after President Obama's speech. Those who participated in the Democracy Corps research were about evenly divided among those who initially supported and opposed the president's health care reform plan and McCain and Obama voters. Among these swing voters, support for Obama's plan rose 20 points (from 46% before the address to 66% after). Moreover, attitudes toward specific aspects of the plan improved sharply following the address.

So far the afterglow from President Obama's speech has had legs. On the Gallup daily tracking of his job performance, the president's approval versus disapproval margin has gone up from nine percentage points to thirteen since his address. In the public survey with the most consistently Republican tilt, the Rasmussen Reports, the number who strongly approve of Obama's performance is up five points since the speech while those who strongly disapprove is down four. Overall, after spending nearly all of August on the downside, a slight majority is now positive about the job President Obama is doing (52% vs. 48%). These are the president's highest marks in the Rasmussen surveys since mid-July.

A CNN-Opinion Research survey conducted with a representative national sample over the weekend after Obama's address provides even greater detail-and more good news. That survey indicates that the president's approval score rose five points since late August (to 58% from 53%). During the same period, Obama's approval rating is up solidly for his handling of specific policy areas: the federal budget deficit (+10 points); taxes (+7); health care policy (+7); the economy (+5); and, foreign affairs (+4). Finally, undoubtedly as a direct result of his address to congress, a majority now favors rather than opposes Obama's plan to reform health care (51% vs. 46%). Most important, strong opposition to the president's plan declined by nine percentage points since CNN last polled on the matter.

But the biggest jump in Barack Obama's poll ratings came in the Daily Kos weekly tracking survey. In just one week, the president's overall favorable to unfavorable margin improved by eight percentage points (favorable up 4 points and unfavorable down 4). Obama's favorable marks week-to-week improved in virtually very demographic and political group except among Republicans. However, the biggest gains came within Democratic core groups including Millennials (young people born 1982-2003), Latinos, residents of the Northeast, and Democratic identifiers. This suggests that, after a period of drift during the summer, what President Obama said last week, especially in his health care reform address, reinforced his base. There is little doubt that Democrats are simply glad that the president is sounding like the man they put in the White House last November.

Unfortunately, President Obama's Democratic colleagues in Congress did not share in the week's polling upswing. The Daily Kos survey indicates that the favorable ratings of Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid, and congressional Democrats overall were essentially unchanged during a week in which the president registered significant gains. Perhaps it is for this reason that GOP consultants are telling Republican candidates to attack congressional Democrats, rather than President Obama, in the 2010-midterm elections. (http://politics.theatlantic.com/2009/09/gop_in_2010_focus_on_dems_in_congress_not_on_obama.php)

 It seems clear that the public, even the Democratic base, is taking a wait and see attitude about inside-the-Beltway Democrats other than President Obama. The coming months will determine whether or not the Democratic majority in Congress is prepared to do the job that it was sent to Washington to do and, among other things, at long last enact meaningful health care reform. This week's polling numbers suggest that would not only be good for America, but also for congressional Democrats. Let's hope they're paying attention.

Michael D. Hais is an NDN Fellow and co-author, with Morley Winograd, of Millennial Makeover: MySpace, You Tube, and the Future of American Politics, named one of the ten favorite books of 2008 by the New York Times.

Last week, I offered up some advice for President Obama on how to shape his speech to the joint session of Congress today. Here are a few more pointers, based on the numbers:

Demonstrate that reforming health care will aid or at least not hurt individual Americans or their families. Surveys conducted by both Pew and the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation have consistently indicated that at least a plurality of the public (albeit a declining one) believe that current health care reform proposals would help the country as whole. At the same time, voters are not as sanguine about the impact of health care reform on themselves and their family. The recent CBS News survey indicates that 31% believe that current congressional health care reform proposals would hurt them personally, while only 18% say they would help. More specifically, voters are more likely to believe that these proposals would raise (41%) rather than reduce (20%) their health care costs; worsen (34%) rather than improve (19%) the quality of their health care; and, make it harder (37%) rather than easier (13%) for them to see a doctor. Similarly, clear pluralities perceive that these proposals would hurt the middle class (43%), seniors (36%), and small businesses (46%). As has occurred so often during the past four decades, Republicans and conservatives, with Democratic assistance, have managed to define a Democratic initiative as a social program that would aid others to the detriment of average Americans. Given this, it's surprising that the public is not more strongly opposed to what it perceives to be President Obama's and Democratic health care reform proposals than it already is. If he does nothing else, the president must use his speech to inform and convince the public that his health care reform proposals will benefit, or at least not hurt, middle class Americans.

Recognize that he and his party are dealing from a position of relative strength, even on the matter of health care reform, than Congress as a whole or the Republican opposition. Even though President Obama's overall job approval score and his marks for handling health care have trended downward over the past several months, they remain well above those of the other actors in this drama. In the most recent Daily Kos tracking survey, only Barack Obama was rated favorably by at least a plurality of voters (52%). By contrast, only a third have favorable impressions of the two Democratic congressional leaders, Nancy Pelosi (32%) and Harry Reid (31%). Less than one in five are positive about the two GOP leaders in Congress, Mitch McConnell (19%) and John Boehner (15%). Only 39% are favorable toward the congressional Democrats as a whole, while just 18% feel that way about the congressional Republicans.

And, with regard specifically to health care reform, the CBS News survey indicates that by a greater than 2:1 margin (50% vs. 23%) voters believe that President Obama has better ideas than Republicans. This margin has remained consistent throughout the summer.

Moreover, the Democratic Party is clearly the majority party both inside Congress and within the electorate, although some reporters seem to forget this. In commenting about President Obama's speech on the Today Show, Chuck Todd said that the setting on Wednesday evening would be odd because "half of the members will be applauding wildly and the other half will be sitting on their hands." Actually, Democrats comprise about 60% of the members of each House and that 10-percentage point difference is of more than academic importance. Democrats not only have enough members in Congress to make more noise than their GOP counterparts, but their edge is sizable enough to control the legislative process if they are willing and have the courage to use it. 

Meanwhile, out in the country, according to both Pew and Ipsos, about half of the electorate identifies with or leans to the Democratic Party. By contrast, only somewhat more than a third say that they are Republicans or lean that way. This is a far different pattern than it was in 1994, the last time Congress considered health care reform, when equal numbers (44%) identified with each party. This Democratic majority is bolstered by the party's disproportionate strength within emerging and growing demographics-Millennials (voters 18-27), Latinos, Asians, and African-Americans-as well as women, who comprise a slight majority of both the population and electorate. These groups underpinned the president's decisive victory in 2008 and continue to support him, his legislative initiatives (including health care reform), and the Democratic Party to a substantially greater extent than other groups.

Stemming from its status as America's majority party, voters continue to have a far more favorable image of Democrats than Republicans on most issues and government management matters.

Obviously, Congress is constitutionally equal to the executive branch. The president cannot simply dictate to or command it to act in order to win a congressional majority. It would also be a plus if at least a few Republicans supported Democratic health care reform initiatives, although seems increasingly unlikely, something that may ultimately force the president and his party to go it alone. Some compromise will likely be necessary to obtain either or both of those ends. But, in his negotiations to achieve those goals President Obama, his staff, and congressional Democrats should recognize that they do some advantages, among them majority status in Congress, a majority coalition within the electorate, and a far higher level of public favorability than the Republicans. This means the president and Democratic congressional leaders should not have to completely roll over to achieve meaningful health care reform. They will not have to do so if they recognize and work from their current position of strength.

A recent Los Angeles Times article maintains that whatever ultimately happens with current healthcare reform proposals, President Obama has taken the matter further than did Bill Clinton, the last president to make such a concerted effort-or indeed any president has since Harry Truman proposed a national health care program six decades ago. What Barack Obama says next Wednesday and does in the weeks that follow will go a long way toward determining whether he will have to be satisfied with the moral victory of simply exceeding his last Democratic predecessor or go on to win final victory. Clearly and forcefully stating his goals and being willing to take advantage of his political and institutional strengths will put him in position to, at long last, win the health care championship.